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Summary  
The Swedish Public Pension Funds, also known as the AP-funds, are the biggest trustees of 
Swedish pension payments. Their mission is to invest the buffer capital of the pension system 
and ensure growth that will provide pension disbursements for generations to come. To fulfil 
this mission investments are made in thousands of companies all over the world. During the 
last years the AP-funds have been heavily criticised for investing in companies that violate 
human rights through their operations.  
 
The fact that business operations may have an adverse impact on the enjoyment of human 
rights has long been known. However it was not until the mid-1990s that the precondition that 
all responsibility for respecting and protecting human rights should be assigned to the State 
was abandoned. Since then the field of business and human rights has grown in importance 
and the responsibility for business actors to respect human rights throughout their operations 
is now commonly acknowledged, even though the extent of the responsibility is still being 
debated. In 2011 the development of business and human rights took a new step when the 
Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UN Guiding Principles) that consists of 31 principles addressing the State 
duty to protect human rights and the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The 
endorsement of the instrument is the first time that the UN member states adopt a common 
position for addressing the adverse human rights impact linked to business operations.  
 
This thesis investigates the responsibility of Sweden and the AP-funds on account of the 
human rights infringements that have been associated with the AP-funds. The conduct of the 
two actors and their compliance with the provisions of the UN Guiding Principles is analysed 
and evaluated in a case study. The first part of the case study analyses the actions of Sweden 
and the fulfilment of the State duty to protect in the case of the AP-funds, whereas the second 
part addresses the AP-funds’ compliance with the responsibility to respect human rights.  
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Sammanfattning 
Allmänna pensionsfonderna, oftast omnämnda som AP-fonderna, är de största förvaltarna i 
det allmänna inkomstpensionsystemet. Fonderna har i uppdrag att investera 
pensionssystemets buffertkapital och eftersträva en hög långsiktig avkastning för att bidra till 
en hög pension för framtida generationer. För att uppfylla sitt uppdrag investerar fonderna i 
tusentals företag runt om i världen. Under de senast åren har AP-fonderna fått mycket kritik 
för sina investeringar i företag som kränker mänskliga rättigheter genom sin verksamhet. 
 
Det faktum att företag och andra privata aktörer kan påverka mänskliga rättigheter negativt 
genom sin verksamhet har varit känt sedan länge, men det var inte förrän under 1990-talet 
som företag tillerkändes ansvar för denna påverkan. Sedan dess har utvecklingen av området 
“business and human rights” gått framåt och privata aktörers ansvar för att respektera 
mänskliga rättigheter i sin verksamhet är nu allmänt erkänt, även om omfattningen av ett 
sådant ansvar fortfarande debatteras. År 2011 tog utvecklingen ytterligare ett steg framåt när 
Human Rights Council enhälligt skrev under Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (UN Guiding Principles). Genom beslutet att skriva under UN Guiding Principles 
antog FNs medlemsländer för första gången en gemensam ståndpunkt för att motverka  
företags negativa inverkan på mänskliga rättigheter. 
 
Uppsatsen undersöker Sveriges och AP-fondernas ansvar för mänskliga rättigheter i 
situationer då kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter kopplas samman med AP-fonderna genom 
deras investeringar. Med utgångspunkt i de internationella principer för business and human 
rights som stadgas i UN Guiding Principles analyseras Sveriges och AP-fondernas sätt att 
hantera fondernas påverkan på mänskliga rättigheter.  
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Abbreviations  
AP-funds Allmänna pensionsfonderna, i e the Public pension funds 
EU European Union 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
GRI Global Reporting Initiative 
HRIA Human rights impacts assessment 
IACHR Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
IFC International Finance Corporation 
ILO International Labour Organization 
NCP National Contact Point 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
SOU Statens offentliga utredningar, i e the Goverments Public Investigations 
UN United Nations 
UNPRI United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The inspiration to the subject of this thesis and the conducting of this research came from a 
postcard, posing the question if I knew what my pension money was doing in that very 
moment. The sender was the Swedish NGO Latinamerikagrupperna and their campaign to 
raise awareness around the fact that the Swedish Public Pension Funds (The AP-funds) have 
invested in a large number of companies criticised for infringing human rights around the 
world. The message received brought me face to face with the disturbing thought that the 
money that I will rely on for my support after my retirement is currently financing projects 
and operations that violates the human rights of others. 
 
The case of the AP-funds is far from unique and during the last years several Swedish 
companies and business actors have been accused of causing or contributing to adverse 
human rights impacts through their operations or in other ways been connected to human 
rights violations.  The majority of these human rights infringements have taken place abroad, 
often in countries where the protection of human rights is weak. A startling aspect of the issue 
is that several of these business actors are closely connected to the Swedish state, as in the 
case with the AP-funds.  
 
The cases of the AP-funds and their connections to human rights infringements abroad can 
serve as an illustration of two different issues. On one hand it demonstrates how a State may 
be involved in human rights infringements outside its territory. On the other hand it is yet 
another example verifying that States are not the only actor that need to take a responsibility 
for human rights enjoyment. The issue of business actors’ adverse impact on human rights 
enjoyment is growing and the current human rights debate involves questions of to what 
extent business actors should be required to observe human rights standards, if they should be 
liable for their violations and whether binding regulations or voluntary action will prove more 
efficient for governing this area.  
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1.1.1 The emergence and development of the idea of business and human rights 
The impact of business operations and the way they could adversely affect local communities 
attracted increased attention in the 1970s. Although there was an understanding that adverse 
effects on the enjoyment of human rights could arise as a result of business operations, the 
responsibility was seen to lie in the domain of governments and holding companies 
accountable was not yet on the agenda.1 When the UN made a first attempt to govern the 
activities of transnational corporations (TNCs)2 with binding international rules in the 1970’s, 
human rights considerations were not featured. This first attempt, known as the Draft UN 
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations was never unanimously approved, 
negotiations came to a halt after a decade and the Code was formally abandoned in 1992.3  
 
It was not until the mid-1990s that the specific discussion of business and human rights came 
into prominence. Until then the precondition that all responsibility for respecting and 
protecting human rights lay with the government had not been questioned.4 The reason for the 
change of this perception, which led to a debate whether a change of allocation of 
responsibilities for human rights protection to business entities was due, is generally ascribed 
to the globalization of the world economy.5 In the 1990s widespread attention was given to 
the negative impacts for human rights enjoyment that had followed the globalization of the 
world economy. This development had highlighted the power of large corporations and their 
limited accountability in law for human rights abuses. When facilitating for these large 
corporations, especially TNCs, to extend economic impact and reach, the capacity for 
governments to control their operations and conditions for the production became limited. 
Since this process was facilitated by developments in national law and policies as well as 
international agreements, both the willingness and the ability of national governments to fulfil 
their human rights responsibilities were seriously questioned.6 
 
                                                
1 Geoffrey Chandler The evolution of the business and human rights debate – In Business and Human rights: 
2 TNC is one of many expressions used to describe a company that operates in different countries. 
3 Ruggie, John Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, The American Journal of 
International Law, p. 819. 
4 Cragg, Wesley et al Human Rights and Business Introduction, Business Ethics Quarterly p.2. 
5 Clapham, Andrew Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006) p. 3f. 
6 Cragg, Wesley et al Human Rights and Business Introduction, p.2. 
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If globalization provided the foundation for this change of perception, the catalyst for the 
development was the arbitrary execution of nine community leaders critical of the social and 
environmental impacts of oil exploitations, by the Nigerian government in 1995. Shell had, as 
the largest foreign investor in Nigeria, a significant leverage with the Nigerian government. 
Despite this, the company refrained from intervening and insisted it had no role to play in the 
internal affairs of a sovereign state. The international condemnation that followed this event 
and the accusations of Shell condoning human rights violations to gain profit showed the 
international business community that new strategies to handle human rights impact were 
urgently needed.7 Subsequently human rights commitments made their way into the voluntary 
ethics codes of large transnational companies, and NGOs increased their efforts to hold 
corporations with international business interests to account for human rights abuses.8 
 
1.1.2 Instruments of Business and Human Rights 
The fact that non-state actors, such as corporations can pose a threat to human rights is not 
something that was discovered as late as in the 1990s. However the development during the 
1990s underlined that existing international instruments didn’t manage to outmanoeuvre these 
threats and the problem brought up for discussion was how to make necessary improvements 
of the governing system. Soft law became a popular method to direct corporate activities in 
the 1970s and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
adopted during this decade, are still significant instruments on the area. The notion of soft law 
implies that the instrument does not create legally binding obligations in itself. Regardless the 
normative role of soft law instruments is essential and serves to further develop the standards 
of corporate responsibility. Since the adoption, governments and businesses have frequently 
referred both to the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD Guidelines.9 
 
During the 1990s when awareness of the need for corporate responsibility grew rapidly new 
sets of voluntary initiatives were created. In 1999 the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
initiated the UN Global Compact, which directly engages companies in promoting ten 
                                                
7 Geoffrey Chandler The evolution of the business and human rights debate, p. 24f. 
8 Cragg, Wesley et al Human Rights and Business Introduction, p.2. 
9  SRSG Report: Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and 
Accountability for Corporate Acts, A/HRC/4/035, 19 Feb. 2007, p. 14f. 
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accepted UN principles in areas such as human rights and environmental protection.10 At the 
same time new discoveries of how the issues that posed a threat to human rights enjoyment 
could also become a risk for the company were made. The combination of these discoveries 
and the pressure from civil society made companies adopt their own policies and principles, a 
sort of self-regulation. The company policies tend to draw on internationally recognized 
instruments and many companies referred to previously mentioned instruments, such as the 
Global Compact or the OECD Guidelines when formulating their policies.11  
 
Even though the development constituted an important progress for the area of business and 
human rights, severe flaws in self-regulation approach were noted. The system with self-
regulation made it convenient for companies to choose what rights to recognize and they 
didn’t necessarily choose to recognize the rights on which they might have the greatest impact. 
The language of the policies also proved to create a problem, even though references to other 
instruments were made the language was rarely identical. And the watered down 
interpretations made it hard, both for the companies and the public to assess the performances 
against the stated commitments. Another severe flaw was that these voluntary commitments 
could not be enforced, in case the company disregarded it.12  Critics claimed that the 
proliferation of these voluntary initiatives allowed for companies to subscribe to different 
initiatives and create an advantageous image, without actually perform any change of core 
principles or practices.13 
 
As a result of the criticism and the escalating reports of corporate human rights abuses, 
binding human rights obligations on companies were being called for. As a response to these 
demands the subcommission to the Human Rights Commission set up an expert group on 
business and human rights in 1998. In 2003 they produced "Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” 
(Draft Norms).14 The Draft Norms were written as if they set out legally binding obligations, 
and were described as a reflection of already existing obligations. The position that the Draft 
                                                
10 UN Global Compact, official homepage: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html. 
11 SRSG Report, A/HRC/4/035, 19 Feb 2007 p.18ff. 
12 SRSG Report, A/HRC/4/035, 19 Feb 2007 p.20ff. 
13 Geoffrey Chandler The evolution of the business and human rights debate, p. 26. 
14 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, Aug. 26, 2003. 
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Norms suggested, that the body of human rights law already applied directly to companies, 
was highly endorsed by human rights advocates and highly opposed by most companies. This 
position received a lot of criticism for lacking support in international law.15 Therefore the 
governmental representatives within the Human Rights Commission declined to adopt the 
Draft Norms and stated that they had no legal standing.16   
 
Even so, the Commission wanted to continue investigating the issue of business and human 
rights in order to keep the question on the agenda and find better ways of governing the area. 
For that reason the Commission requested that the UN Secretary-General appointed a Special 
Representative (SRSG) on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. The request was approved and in 2005 John Ruggie was appointed 
SRSG for business and human rights.17 The final result of his mandate is the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights. The Human Rights Council endorsed the UN 
Guiding Principles in 2011, with the expectation that it will establish a common global 
platform for actions regarding business and human rights.18 
 
The history of business and human rights did not end in 2011, quite contrary the importance 
of the area seems to be growing steadily. The recent examples of Swedish companies 
associated with human rights infringements show that the area is of immediate interest and 
importance also for a country with the reputation and self-image of being a defender of the 
universal human rights. The allegations of the connections to human rights violations have 
received attention, the business actors have been criticised and the violations condemned from 
a moral point of view. Still there are questions to discuss from a legal perspective, and in 
particular with regard to the international principles concerning business and human rights.  
 
 
 
                                                
15 Knox, John H The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations - In The UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundation and Implementation edited by Radu Mares (2012) p. 53f.  
16 Knox, John H The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations, p. 61. 
17 Ruggie, John Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, p. 821. 
18 HRC Resolution 17/4: Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
A/HRC/RES/17/4, 6 July 2011.  
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1.2 Purpose and Research question 
The purpose of this thesis is to further investigate the responsibility for the state and the 
business actor in these situations to determine whether their actions and/or omissions could be 
criticised for failing to meet international standards of business and human rights.  
 
The thesis will focus on the example of Sweden and the AP-funds. The choice of subjects for 
this investigation is motivated by the fact that the AP-funds are actors with a considerable 
influence, as they manage a large fund capital and invest in numerous companies around the 
world. The potential of the AP-funds to impact the enjoyment of human rights, for better or 
for worse, must therefore be considered as significant. It is also actors with a very close 
connection to the State and the Swedish citizens, which should imply a strong policy rationale 
to ensure respect for human rights. However, the responsibility of the State is equally 
important and both the state responsibility to protect and the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights will be addressed.  
 
To fulfil the purpose of the thesis and further investigate the responsibilities of these actors 
from a business and human rights aspect, the point of departure will be the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human rights adopted in 2011. There are of course several 
adequate instruments of business and human rights that could be used as a benchmark to 
evaluate the actions of the subjects in question. Nonetheless, the UN Guiding Principles 
enjoys a particular legitimacy from being unanimously endorsed by the Human Rights 
Council, this being the first time the UN member states adopted a common position for 
addressing the risk of adverse human rights impact linked to business activities. The 
instrument also represents the latest progress in the area of business and human rights as 
described above. Furthermore, it is the only set of principles that incorporates the shared but 
differentiated responsibilities of states and business actors in the same instrument, which suits 
the aim of this thesis.  
 
With Sweden and the AP-funds as the subjects for investigation and the UN Guiding 
Principles as the point of departure from which the investigation will be conducted, the 
research question to be answered in this thesis is: Do Sweden and the AP-funds fulfil the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights?   
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1.3 Material and Method 
To answer the research question a case study will be conducted. This thesis mainly uses a 
traditional legal method and investigates Sweden’s and the AP-funds’ compliance with the 
provisions of the UN Guiding Principles regarding the State duty to protect human rights and 
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.  
 
The UN Guiding Principles is an instrument with the aim of guiding the conduct of states and 
business actors to help them establish efficient policies and measures to address issues of 
human rights. The focus of the case study will therefore be the legislation and policies 
governing the AP-funds and their human rights considerations, and the evaluation concerns 
the instruments and measures taken to address adverse human rights impacts rather than the 
actual result. The analysis does not contain any empirical studies of the outcome of the 
process although two examples of actual cases and the measures taken by the Funds with 
regards to these situations are described.  
 
The analysis of Sweden’s compliance with the principles in Pillar I of the UN Guiding 
Principles is based on legislation, preparatory works and official policy documents that 
concern the AP-funds. As always when evaluating Swedish legislation, the preparatory works 
(travaux préparatoires) is an important source that provides a foundation for the analysis of 
the legislation. The preparatory works in this case are important for the governing of the AP-
funds and will be included in the case study.  
 
The point of departure for the analysis of the AP-funds is primarily the official ownership 
policies of the Funds. The annual reports of the Funds together with the reports from the 
Funds’ Ethical council, where reports regarding their work with ethical considerations are 
incorporated have also been analysed.   
 
1.4 Delimitations 
There are many aspects from which the legal responsibility of the state in these situations 
could be discussed. The aim of this thesis is however to examine the question from a business 
and human rights perspective, which means that state responsibility on a more general level 
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will not be discussed. I would therefore like to make it clear that even though the “ILC Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” will be mentioned, I 
will not go further and try to conclude if the human rights infringements that have been 
associated with the AP-funds could be defined as internationally wrongful acts of Sweden, 
since that would go beyond the purpose of this thesis.  
 
Another important delimitation of this thesis is that the provisions in Pillar III of the UN 
Guiding Principles wont be a part of the analysis conducted. The third pillar contains 
provisions regarding the State’s duty to ensure access to effective remedy, and forms an 
important part of the instrument that is the UN Guiding Principles. The reason for omitting 
this pillar is that these provisions are only applicable if the human rights abuses have occurred 
within the territory of the state.19 In the case of Sweden and the AP-funds, the violations of 
human rights occur almost exclusively outside the territory of Sweden and the provisions in 
Pillar III are therefore not applicable to the issue in question. 
 
The sixth AP-fund will also be left out of the analysis. AP 6 has a different investment 
strategy and invests almost entirely in companies in the Nordic region, primarily in Sweden.20 
It is also the smallest fund in terms of fund capital. These are all factors that make an 
evaluation of the conduct of AP 6 less interesting for to the purpose and aim of this thesis. 
Furthermore the possibility of conducting this kind of evaluation is limited since there is not 
any policy statement or other material to analyse, the short sections describing strategy and 
mission on the official homepage do not mention ethical considerations either.21 As a 
consequence of this the AP 6 will not be featuret in this thesis.  
                                                
19 See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – Principle 25. 
20 Strategy of AP-fund 6 http://www.apfond6.se/en/English/Mission-and-strategy/. 
21 http://www.apfond6.se/en/English/Mission-and-strategy/ 
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2. The subjects; Sweden and the AP-funds 
The area of business and human rights has diverged from the traditional human rights regime 
since the start, by introducing the idea of private entities as duty-bearers for human rights. 
This development has been lauded for opening up opportunities to counter the adverse effects 
on human rights that business activities may cause, but it has also been criticized for offering 
an easy escape for laggard states that are unwilling to take their responsibility. Therefore 
current research underlines the importance of keeping both actors in the picture when 
discussing these issues, and a shared but differentiated responsibility is most commonly 
advocated. From this perspective it has been a conscious decision to scrutinize the actions of 
both state and business actor for the purpose of this thesis.  
 
Therefore this chapter will present the two actors of interest for this investigation, namely 
Sweden and the AP-funds. The first section of the chapter will give a brief introduction to 
some of the human rights commitments undertaken by the Swedish State. The description will 
focus on the area relevant for this investigation - business and human rights - and regulations 
and policies for human rights when operating abroad. This part of the chapter will also 
provide a couple of examples of companies questioned for not respecting human rights in 
their operations outside of Sweden.  
 
The following section will give an introduction to the AP-funds and their operations. First of 
all the status of the AP-funds will be discussed, since this provides an important foundation 
for the case study to come. The section will also describe the role of the Funds in the pension 
system and how the Funds operate and invest. In connection to this, the debate regarding 
ethical considerations in these operations will be mentioned. To illustrate the problem from 
which the current discussion derive, the chapter will end with a description of the human 
rights infringements that has taken place in connection with two of the projects that the AP-
funds have invested in.  
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2.1 Sweden in focus 
Sweden prides itself with being deeply committed to the protection and promotion of human 
rights. Being a long-standing supporter of the UN work on human rights, in both political and 
economic terms, Sweden enjoys a good reputation on human rights protection around the 
world.22 Sweden also declares to be a strong defender on the international human rights 
system and is a State party to the core UN conventions on human rights, as well as the 
regional European conventions.23 
 
Regarding the specific area of business and human rights the government has expressed an 
intention to promote business and human rights internationally. In the candidature to the 
Human Rights Council for the period of 2013-2015, business and human rights is presented as 
one of nine focus areas that Sweden would endorse, if being elected to the council.24 
 
On the national level business and human rights is being acknowledged as an important issue. 
The Delegation for Human Rights in Sweden, appointed by the Swedish Parliament, 
conducted between 2006-2010 investigations with the mission to present proposals on how to 
provide continued support for the work towards ensuring respect for human rights in Sweden. 
In the final report from the Delegation, the business community is recognized as an important 
actor to protect and promote human rights. Among other things the Delegation propose the 
government to take practical measures to implement the “Protect, Respect, Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights”25, and to earmark sufficient means for this 
assignment.26  
 
Human rights are furthermore a prioritized issue in Swedish foreign policy. Promoting and 
increasing respect for human rights globally is set out as a goal in the government statement 
for human rights in Swedish foreign policy. To achieve this goal the government stresses the 
importance of coherent and effective policy that incorporates human rights in all areas of 
                                                
22 Candidature of Sweden to the Human Rights Council, A/67/124, 2012-07-02, p. 2. 
23 Candidature of Sweden to the Human Rights Council, A/67/124, p. 6, see also government homepage on 
human rights, www.manskligarattigheter.se, for the full list of ratified conventions. 
24 Candidature of Sweden to the Human Rights Council, p. 5. 
25 Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5 (2008). 
26 SOU 2010:70 Ny struktur för skydd av mänskliga rättigheter, p. 461f.  
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foreign policy. According to this statement, the importance of human rights in development-, 
security-, and trade policy is steadily increasing and is being brought out as an important 
aspect in migration- and environmental policy.27 
 
The government declares to be working consistently to improve their policy for promoting 
human rights through further collaboration and coordination between different policy areas. 
For that reason Sweden, as the first country in the world, has established a policy for 
equitable and sustainable development that should apply to all policy areas.28 The policy 
known as “Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s policy for Global Development” was first 
presented in a government bill in 2003 and renewed in 2008.29  The policy is based on the 
perception that the only way of achieving equitable and sustainable development is for every 
policy area to work towards the same goals and with the same values. Hence, one of the 
fundamental principles is that a rights perspective based on international human rights 
conventions shall permeate all policy areas, not only development and aid policy but also 
areas such as international trade policy. The policy for global development also emphasizes 
the importance of a closer collaboration with actors in all sectors of society, including the 
business sector.30 
 
As apparent from the above-mentioned extracts of different policy documents and political 
statements, both the issue of business and human rights and the importance of respecting 
human rights when operating outside the national territory, have been discussed and to some 
extent incorporated in current policies. But despite the expressed ambitions and policies there 
are recent examples of situations where the actual effects seem scarce. During the last year 
several Swedish companies have been criticized for infringing human rights when operating 
outside the Swedish border and among these are a number of state-owned companies. This 
seems to indicate a disconnection between the international reputation of Sweden and the 
actual practices of its companies. 
 
                                                
27 Regeringens skrivelse 2007/08:109 Mänskliga rättigheter i svensk utrikespolitik, p. 7. 
28 Regeringens skrivelse 2007/08:109, p. 7f. 
29 Proposition 2002/03:122 Gemensamt ansvar: Sveriges politik för global utveckling, and Regeringens skrivelse 
2007/08:89 Sveriges politik för global utveckling.  
30 Proposition 2002/03:122, p. 1f. 
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TeliaSonera is probably the company that has received most attention in the press. This 
telecom operator, in which Sweden has a 37 percent stake, offers its services in the Nordic 
and Baltic countries, but also in the Eurasian markets, including Russia, Belarus and 
Turkey.31 In April 2012 Swedish television broadcasted a TV-reportage, revealing how the 
regimes in Belarus, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan got access to information from mobile 
operators owned by TeliaSonera. The regimes use this type of information to track and listen 
in to members of the opposition, in a way that clearly violates the rights to freedom of 
expression and privacy.32 Throughout the fall more negative publicity has been rendered to 
TeliaSonera, this time due to allegations of bribery, money laundering and human rights 
infringements in Uzbekistan.33 
 
Another example of a Swedish state-owned company that has been accused of contributing to 
human rights infringements during the last year is Swedfund. Defined as a bilateral 
Development Finance Institution, Swedfund is wholly owned by the Swedish government and 
make high-risk investments in developing countries around the world.34 According to the 
webpage Swedfund’s mission is “to help in enabling poor people to improve their lives” and 
”to bring about strengthened democracy, equitable and sustainable development”.35 The 
fulfilment of this mission has been questioned, for example with regard to investments made 
in Sierra Leone. In November 2011 Swedfund invested 90 million crowns from the Swedish 
development aid budget in the company Addax Bioenergy to finance an ethanol project in 
Sierra Leone. During 2012 Addax has been accused of land grabbing, due to the poor 
compensation given to farmers letting out their land to the project, and of violating the right to 
food and water for people in the area.36 Swedfund has during the year also been criticized for 
investing in companies that do not respect fundamental worker’s rights.37 
 
The Swedish AP-funds also qualifies for this list of business actors connected to the State and 
involved in operations or projects criticized for violating human rights. The following part of 
                                                
31 About TeliaSonera - http://www.teliasonera.com/en/about-us/teliasonera-in-brief/. 
32 Uppdrag granskning: TeliaSonera i hemligt samarbete med diktaturer, television reportage (2012). 
33 Transcript of statement from the CEO of TeliaSonera, TeliaSonera official homepage (2012). 
34 About Swedfund -  http://www.swedfund.se/en/about-swedfund/. 
35 ibid. 
36 Ekot: Svenska investeringar används till land grabbing, radio broadcast (2012). 
37 Ekot: Statliga Swedfund kränker arbetsrätten, radio broadcast (2012). 
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this chapter will be dedicated to the Funds, their role in the Swedish pension system, their 
mission and their investments. 
 
2.2 The AP-funds 
Being the biggest trustees of Swedish pension payments, the six state-owned AP-funds play 
an important part in the national income pension system. The AP-funds, or Allmänna 
Pensionsfonderna (the public pension funds) invest pension payments from all Swedish 
income earners to make the pension buffer grow and provide pension disbursements for 
generations to come. Undoubtedly, this mission comes with a huge economic responsibility to 
safeguard the income of current and future pensioners. An urgent question that remains to be 
answered is to what extent a responsibility for making sure that the operations and 
investments are made with consideration to human rights also follows with the mission. 
 
2.2.1 Status of the AP-funds 
To address questions of responsibility and draw conclusions on fulfilment of obligations one 
must first conclude which obligations that are of relevance. One important factor for the 
definition of relevant obligations is what type of actor that is in question – since the different 
obligations have different actors as addressees. The definition of a subject belonging to a 
certain group of actors does not generally constitute a difficulty. However, the case of the AP-
funds is not as straightforward. The aim with this section is therefore to clarify the status of 
the AP-funds. 
 
The operations and organization of the Funds are exclusively regulated in the Swedish Public 
Pension Funds Act (2000:192) and The Sixth AP-funds Act (200:193).  In accordance with 
these laws, the government appoints a board to each fund.38 Each of these boards constitutes a 
government agency. 39 The six AP-funds represent a distinct category among the government 
agencies and differ from the majority in the way they are regulated. Whereas government 
directives are used to regulate most government agencies, the regulation of the AP-funds is 
done exclusively through legislation and the autonomy of the Funds is of great importance.  
In the preparatory material of the Public Pension Funds Act it is stated that the board should 
                                                
38 3:2 § The Swedish Public Pension Funds Act (2000:192) and 2:1 § The Sixth AP-funds Act (2000:193). 
39 Proposition 1999/2000:46 AP-fonden i det reformerade pensionssytemet, p. 50. 
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have the full responsibility for the investment operations and that the government should not 
be given the possibility to control or direct the funds through instructions, appropriation 
directions or by earmarking money.40 Furthermore, the assets of the Funds cannot be taken in 
use for any other purpose than the one provided for in the law, and to change this purpose the 
Parliament must agree to change the law.41 
 
The definition of the AP-funds as government agencies means that the Funds constitute a part 
of the organization of the State. Establishing the Funds as a part of the State in national law 
will also have implications within international law. States are regarded as the primary subject 
and duty-bearer within international law and human rights law. Therefore treaties and 
conventions generally contain provisions with direct obligations for states. The fact that the 
AP-funds are a part of the State would consequently mean that the Funds are obliged to 
follow the conventions ratified by the Swedish state.  
 
Although the definition of the AP-funds as a part of the State seem to place additional 
obligations on the Funds this classification might prove to have more implications for the 
State than the actual Funds. One such implication of the Funds being defined as a government 
agency and a part of the State is the close connection that it establishes between the actions of 
the Funds and the State, a connection that could lead to legal consequences for the State. 
According the “ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts” an internationally wrongful act of a State consists of an act or omission attributable to 
the State that constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.42 According to 
article 4, actions taken by organs of the State shall be considered an act of the State, where 
organs of the State includes any entity that has that status in the internal law of the State.43 
The commentary makes it clear that this cover any organ whether it exercises legislative, 
judicial, executive or any other functions. This includes all the individual or collective entities 
which make up the organization of the State and act on its behalf.44 The actions of the AP-
                                                
40 Proposition 1999/2000:46, p. 121f. 
41 Proposition 1999/2000:46, p. 50 
42 Article 2, ILC Draft Articles on  Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) 
43 Article 4, ILC Draft Articles on  Responsibility of States. 
44 Commentary to Article 4, ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, p. 40f. 
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funds are therefore to be seen as attributable to the State, which means that actions carried out 
by the Funds could entail international responsibility of the State.45 
 
Government agency is not the only label than may be used to describe the AP-funds. The 
Funds do at the same time constitute a business actor, belonging to a group commonly termed 
“institutional investors”. The group of institutional investors include insurance companies, 
pension funds, investment banks and managers and sovereign wealth funds. These are all 
entities managing financial resources to invest in equities, bonds and other investment 
products.46  
 
The role of the AP-funds as business actors or institutional investors is further analysed in 
“The Policy for governing and evaluation of the AP-funds”. This policy document sets out the 
principles for the annual report and evaluation of the AP-funds that the government 
conducts.47 The first part of the policy starts out with defining the characteristics of the Funds 
and compares the Funds with State-owned companies. Even though the funds do not 
constitute own legal objects separated from the State as the State-owned companies, there are 
many common characteristics. As in the case of “regular” or state-owned companies, the 
boards of the Funds have operational autonomy and carry the responsibility for the 
management of the Fund. The way the boards are responsible for the financing of the Funds 
through the resources managed by the Funds is similar to the way an insurance company 
operates. What distinguishes the Funds from a “regular” company is that these resources have 
not been acquired on a competitive market; instead the Funds are financed with public means. 
However, the investment operations are downright business activities and do not differ from 
the investment procedures of “regular” institutional investors.48 
 
By dissecting the whereabouts of the AP-funds I want to ensure an understanding of the 
complexities of this actor that may represent different categories depending on what aspect 
                                                
45 Compare Article 1, ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States. 
46 Hachez, Nicolas and Sullivan, Rory Human Rights Norms for Business: The missing piece of the Ruggie 
Jigsaw - In The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundation and Implementation edited 
by Radu Mares (2012) p. 217f 
47 Policy för styrning och utvärdering av AP-fonderna, Appendix 1 to Regeringens skrivelse 2011/12:130 
Redovisning av AP-fondernas verksamhet t o m 2011. 
48Policy för styrning och utvärdering av AP-fonderna, Appendix 1 to Regeringens skrivelse 2011/12:130, p. 72f. 
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you look at. From a legal point of view the Funds are established as government agencies, and 
as such organs of the state. Nevertheless, with regard to the operations of the Funds they 
qualify as institutional investors, and as such business actors. This understanding of the Funds 
is crucial for understanding the way the case study will be conducted. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the conduct of the AP-funds will be analysed in the function of a business actor. 
Whereas the analysis of the responsibility of the State will include the actions taken by the 
whole organization of the State. The fact that the AP-funds are organs of the state is still of 
importance since this makes their actions a direct concern of the State. 
 
2.2.2. The role of the AP-funds in the pension system 
The Swedish national pension system is divided into two types of pension insurances, the first 
one guarantees a basic pension for persons settled in Sweden based on the domicile principle. 
The other, and more significant part is the ATP-pension (Allmänna tilläggspensionen) where 
the pension disbursements are based on a person’s income throughout his or hers working 
life.49  The ATP-pension is then subdivided in two parts, the income pension and the premium 
pension. The income pension works as a distribution system where outgoing pensions are 
funded on an on-going basis by pension contributions from income taxes, whereas the 
premium pension is financed by money funds consolidated during the vested period.50 
  
The individual contributes to the national pensions system with a total of 18,5 per cent of his 
or her pension-qualifying income, 16 per cent goes to the income pension system and 2,5 per 
cent to the premium pension system.51 AP-fund 1-4 and AP-fund 6 all form part of the 
income pension system, whereas the seventh AP-fund is a part of the premium pension 
system. (Due to a re-structure in 2000 AP-fund 5 no longer exist.)52  
 
During periods when worker contributions to the income pension system exceed the amount 
to be paid to the pensioners, the surplus is allocated to AP-funds 1, 2, 3, and 4. The funds 
manage the money and build up a buffer capital that is used during periods when 
                                                
49 Proposition 1999/2000:46 p. 55f. 
50 Proposition 1999/2000:46 p. 55f. 
51 About the AP-funds –http://ap1.se/sv/Om-AP1/Var-roll-i-pensionssystemet/. 
52 Proposition 1999/2000:46 p. 2.  
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disbursements exceed contributions.53 The 2,5 per cent of the pension-qualifying income that 
goes to the premium pension system is being managed according to the individual’s own 
choice. The seventh AP-fund manages the money of investors that does not actively select a 
pension fund manager or who want a government-managed fund.54 By the end of 2011 AP 7 
represented 2,8 million premium pension savers and managed their savings.55 
 
The AP-funds manage a large fund capital; by the 30th of June 2012 the total assets of the six 
funds amounted to more than 1000 billion Swedish crowns.56  With this capital the Funds 
constitute a powerful actor on the international investment market. In 2008 the Funds were 
estimated to be the sixth largest state pension fund in the world.57 
 
The common mission of the AP-funds is to manage the fund capital in such a way as to 
generate the highest possible benefit for the pension system.58 In order to achieve this mission 
the assets of the Funds are placed in a global portfolio consisting of equities, fixed income 
securities and alternative investments that include real estate, private equity funds and hedge 
funds.59 
 
2.2.4 Current debate about the AP-funds and their ethical guidelines 
Ethical guidelines and adverse human rights impact of investments of the AP-funds have been 
recurring topics of conversation during the last years.  In 2008 a state investigation presented 
the results from an evaluation of how the Funds lived up to their obligations to take 
environmental and ethical considerations, including human rights, into account in their 
investment activities.60  
 
The investigation committee considered the AP-funds to have dealt, under the circumstances, 
commendably with these issues, but also offered several propositions for improvement. Some 
                                                
53 About the AP-funds – http://ap1.se/sv/Om-AP1/Var-roll-i-pensionssystemet/. 
54 About AP-fund 7 – http://www.ap7.se/sv/Om-AP7/Var-uppgift/. 
55 Regeringens skrivelse 2011/12:130 p. 29. 
56 See semi-annual reports of the AP-funds. 
57 SOU 2008:107 Etiken, miljön och pensionerna, p. 38. 
58 4:1 § Swedish Public Pension Acts (2000:192). 
59 About the AP-funds – http://ap1.se/sv/Om-AP1/Var-roll-i-pensionssystemet/. 
60 SOU 2008:107 Etiken. 
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of the more significant ones included a proposition to incorporate ethical and environmental 
provisions in the Public Pension Funds Act and a call for the Funds to define a set of 
principles or basic values on which to base their activities incorporating ethical considerations. 
The committee also proposed that the sufficient resources should be set aside to insure quality 
in work with these issues.61 In their annual report to the parliament about the AP-funds, the 
government supported the propositions directly addressed to the AP-funds, while the 
proposition regarding a change of the law was postponed. 62  
 
In 2011 an investigation conducted by the Swedish parliament’s independent investigation 
service (Riksdagens Utredningstjänst) brought new attention to the issues of human rights 
infringements in companies that the AP-funds invest in. The results of the investigation were 
presented in a report called “The investments of the AP-funds” (“AP-fondernas 
investeringar”) and showed that the holdings of the AP-funds included several companies that 
are known to violate human rights, are accused of unethical business operations or have been 
blacklisted by other institutional investors.63  	  
Following the report several NGOs launched campaigns to raise public awareness to the 
question and influence the politicians to address the problem, among these FIAN Sweden, 
Latinamerikagrupperna and Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation.64 In September 2011 
Latinamerikagrupperna published a report concerning the adverse effects on human rights 
associated with the AP-funds.65 Another report focusing on the AP-funds investments in 
companies owning gold mines in Latin America, and the human rights violations associated 
with this industry was published the same month by the independent non-profit organization 
Swedwatch.66  
 
Parallel to these actions conducted by the civil society the government appointed a Buffer 
Fund Inquiry to evaluate the legislation surrounding the AP-funds. The mission for the 
                                                
61 SOU 2008:107 p. 17f. 
62 Regeringens skrivelse 2008/09:130 Redovisning av AP-fondernas verksamhet t o m 2008 p. 74f. 
63 Swedwatch report #42 Rena Guldgruvan? AP-fondernas investeringar har en smutsig baksida, (2011) p.3. 
64 Campaign page - http://globalportalen.org/kampanj/uppmana-regeringen-och-ap-fonderna-att-investera-etiskt-
och-klimatsmart. 
65 Latinamerikagrupperna: AP-fondernas ohållbara investeringar, September 2011. 
66 Swedwatch report #42 (2011). 
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Inquiry was primarily to provide conditions to improve the cost-efficiency for the 
management to buffer capital of the pensions system, but a part concerning the question of 
ethical guidelines has also been incorporated in the evaluation.67 Unlike the committee behind 
the 2008 report, the Inquiry did not consider that ethical provisions should have a feature in 
the legislation.68 
 
The Inquiry has received criticism from several NGOs for not addressing the issue of ethical 
guidelines properly and in a debate article published at SVT Debatt the 24 August 2012 the 
president of Latinamerikagrupperna argued that consideration of human rights and the 
environment must be upgraded to have the same significance as the goal of effective yield. 
Therefore he urged the members of the Parliament’s pension committee to ensure that these 
changes are made when changing the legislation.69  	  
This question is also subject to discussion in the Parliament. Vänsterpartiet [The Left Party] 
and Miljöpartiet [The Green Party], both of which have been previously very active in this 
question, have recently submitted motions with propositions to strengthen the importance of 
ethical and environmental considerations in the operations of the AP-funds.70 Whether this 
will lead to a change of the legislation and a shift from the current situation where economic 
considerations are to be prioritized over ethical and environmental considerations, to the 
suggested equal importance of these considerations remains to be seen. However the question 
has engaged and involved several actors and persons and remains important.   
 
The following section will present two of the situations that have given rise to the debate, 
situations where the investments of the AP-funds have been associated with human rights 
infringements. 
 
 
 
                                                
67 SOU 2012:53 AP-fonderna i pensionssystemet,effektivare förvaltning av pensionsreserven p. 3ff. 
68 SOU 2012:53 p. 275ff. 
69 AP-fondernas etikarbete måste bli bättre, Article at SVT Debatt, 2012-08-24. 
70 See for example Motion 2012/13:Fi225 and Motion 2012/2013:Fi206. 
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2.3 The AP-funds and Human Rights infringements  
The aim with this part of the thesis is to illustrate the reality from which the debate on 
business and human rights derives. The two present cases constitute representative examples 
of the adverse effects that business operations may have on the enjoyment of human rights.  
Both examples are taken from the gold mining industry in Latin America and are associated 
with the AP-funds through the investments made in the companies owning the mines and 
running the operations. This description is a compilation of human rights infringements 
reported in connection to the mining operations. How the AP-funds have responded to these 
reports and whether the measures taken have been sufficient will be discussed in the case 
study. 	  
2.3.1 Goldcorp and the Marlin mine  
The Marlin mine is located in the western highlands of Guatemala, the poorest and most 
populated province in the country. The mine is owned by the Canadian company Goldcorp 
through its subsidiary Montana Explorer.71 All AP-funds except AP 6 currently holds a 
substantial amount of equities in Goldcorp72, and has through these investments become 
associated with the human rights abuses taking place in Guatemala. 
 
The mine was established in 2004 with financial help from IFC. The loan was granted on the 
condition that indigenous rights would be respected. The mine began operating in 2005 and 
extract gold and silver through a combination of open pit and underground mine technology. 
The gold and silver are then leached using a cyanide process.73 Since 2012 open pit operations 
ceased and the mine is now an underground operation only. Even so Goldcorp has claimed 
that exploration activities indicate that there is plenty of minerals yet to be extracted 
underground, which will extend the life of the mine. The corporation also plans to extend its 
operations to other nearby areas.74 
 
                                                
71 Swedwatch report #42 p. 40. 
72 See the AP-funds’ lists of holdings from 2012-06-30.  
73 Human Rights assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin mine, May 2010, p.9. 
74 Goldcorp’s official webpage - http://www.goldcorp.com/English/Unrivalled-Assets/Mines-and-
Projects/Central-and-South-America/Operations/Marlin/Overview-and-Operating-Highlights/default.aspx. 
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The Marlin mine has been controversial since the start and surrounded by allegations of 
human rights abuses. A majority of the population in the area affected by the mine belong to 
different indigenous groups. Together with the Catholic Church and environmental 
organizations they protest against the human rights abuses and the environmental damage that 
are the result of the mine.75  
 
The criticism towards Marlin mine concerns a wide range of areas. According to an 
independent human rights impacts assessment (hereafter HRIA) of the mine carried out in 
2009, Montana Explorer failed to respect the rights of indigenous people by not involving the 
indigenous groups in the area in a prior consultation. The right to prior consultation is a key 
element of indigenous peoples’ rights closely connected to the rights to decide their priorities 
for development and the right to natural resources pertaining to their lands.76 These rights are 
all incorporated in the ILO Convention 169 – Indigenous and Tribal peoples Convention, to 
which Guatemala has been a ratified party since 1996.77 
 
Several cases of health problems among the people living close to the mine have also been 
reported since the inception of the mine operations. The HRIA refrained from stating the 
situation to be an infringement of the right to health – due to the lack of public health 
information and insufficient diagnostic capacity. Instead the HRIA levelled harsh criticism 
against Montana Explorer for a lack of due diligence since the company hasn’t collected 
necessary information to determine whether the right to health and the right to food have been 
infringed.78 Nonetheless, a number of smaller studies made by other organizations have 
demonstrated negative health effects on people living in the area close to the mine.79 The 
negative effects on the health is closely connected to the reports on the water downstream 
from the mine being polluted, a situation that constitute an infringement to the right to 
water.80 
 
                                                
75 Swedwatch report # 42, p. 41. 
76 Human Rights assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin mine, p.12 
77 International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 1989. 
78 Human Rights assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin mine, p.15 
79 Swedwatch report # 42, p. 43. 
80 COPAE: Second Annual Report on the Monitoring and Analysis of the Water Quality, 2009. 
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Furthermore people engaged in campaigns against the mine have been subject to persecution, 
harassments and threats. There have been several confrontations where the mine’s private 
security guards have been involved. On at least two occasions the security guards have killed 
people opposing the mining operations.81 
 
The list of human rights infringements could be made even longer, among other things a 
considerable number of infringements of labour rights and land grabbing have also been 
reported.82 And when making the assessment regarding infringements of right to own 
property and the right to adequate housing the HRIA concluded that “While recent studies do 
not definitely establish that the mine has caused the damage, they eliminate all other 
reasonable explanations.”83 
 
In 2010 the number of reports and allegations of human rights abuses made the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) call to the Guatemalan state and Goldcorp 
to immediately suspend mining activities. The decision came as a response to a petition filed 
by the communities surrounding affected by the Marlin mine and the Commission 
recommended that activities would be suspended until it could issue a decision on the merits 
of the petition. After the decision the Guatemalan government submitted a declaration that 
they would take care of the problem and asked the IACHR to lift its recommendation of 
suspension, which the IACHR did in December 2011. All issues are far from solved and the 
work to ensure the enjoyment of human rights in the area continues.84  
 
2.3.2 Newmont and the Yanacocha mine 
Another gold mine in Latin America infamous for conflicts and human rights abuses is the 
Yanacocha mine. Located in the north part of Yanacocha it is the largest gold mine in Latin 
America. The mine is a joint venture and the largest owner is Newmont Mining, a company 
from the United States that owns 51,35 per cent. The Peruvian mining company Cia de Minas 
                                                
81 OHCHR: Informe del Relator Especial de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de los pueblos indigenas 
James Anaya, (2011). 
82 Human Rights assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin mine, p. 17ff. 
83 Human Rights assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin mine, p.15. 
84 Annual report of the Ethical council (2011), p. 16f. 
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Buenaventura owns 43, 65 per cent and the IFC owns the last 5 per cent.85 All AP-funds, once 
again with the exception of AP 6, have invested and own equities in Newmont mining. AP 1 
also has holdings in Cia de Minas Buenaventura.86 
 
Yanacocha extracts gold from open pit operations after which the gold is leached through a 
cyanide process. The operations begun in 1993 and the mine has an estimated lifetime of 30 
years. Simultaneously another mining project, Minas Conga, is being constructed right next to 
Yanacocha. The production is estimated to start in 2014.87 
 
As is the case with several mining operations, water has been a constant issue of conflict since 
the conception of the mine. The mining operations in Yanacocha require enormous amounts 
of water, and in this area the water resources were already scarce. Peru is one of the countries 
in Latin America considered most vulnerable to the lack of water that is an effect of the 
climate changes. The shortage of water strikes hard against the surrounding communities and 
the negative effects on the living conditions since the inception of the mine have made many 
people leave the area.88  
 
In 2010 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing the human right to water 
and sanitation. The resolution acknowledges that access to clean drinking water is essential to 
realization of all human rights.89 The inhabitants in the area around Yanacocha have lost this 
access as a result of the mining operations. Local authorities have confirmed that there have 
been outlets of acidic water from the mine on several occasions. Fish and frogs that used to 
live in the watercourses are gone and the farmers testify that their animals have become sick 
after drinking the water. The company itself confirms that some of the water that has been 
used in the mining operations and is then being let out is not suitable for drinking and should 
only be used for the agriculture – a practice allowed according to Peruvian legislation.90  
 
                                                
85 Yanacocha official homepage - http://www.yanacocha.com.pe/la-compania/quienes-somos/. 
86 See lists of holdings of the AP-funds, 2012-06-30.  
87 Swedwatch report #42 p. 25. 
88 Swedewatch report #42 p. 28. 
89 United Nations General Assembly Resolution Right to Water and Sanitation, A/RES/64/292, 3 August 2010. 
90 Swedwatch report #42 p. 25ff. 
 30 
The company carries out controls in cooperation with local authorities but the confidence for 
these reports is low among the local population. On-going and previous independent studies 
show and have shown high contents of heavy metals in the water, which constitutes a serious 
risk to human health.91  
 
Another major issue at the Yanacocha mine concerns the security and conflicts with the local 
inhabitants. There have been conflicts between the local inhabitants and the mining company 
ever since the beginning of the mining operations, many of them connected to the pollution 
and lack of water. In 2000 mercury from the mine leaked and poisoned more than a thousand 
persons in Choropampa in an accident that received much attention and led to a deeper 
mistrust against the company. The mercury accident became a starting point for the 
mobilization against the mine, a mobilization that has grown along with the plans of 
expansion of the mine.92  
 
The disagreements in themselves are not the issue of concern from a human rights perspective, 
but rather the way the company and the Peruvian government handle them. Opponents of the 
mine have on several occasions been harassed and threatened to life by security guards from 
Yanacocha. The threats against the catholic priest Marco Arana, famous for his commitment 
to the environment and resistance to the mining operations, were noticed and condemned by 
Amnesty International and Inter American Court of Human Rights.93   
 
The protests against the mine and the expansion of the mine have gathered hundreds and 
sometimes thousands of people in protest demonstrations. Police and security guards from 
Yanacocha have treated the demonstrators with violence and on more than one occasion 
demonstrators have been shot to death.94 The recent expansion of the mine to the Conga area 
has given rise to massive protests. The situation has degenerated and the government has 
declared state of emergency in northern Peru three times since December 2011. Five 
protestors have been killed and 21 seriously injured in the course of the recent protests.95  
                                                
91 Swedwatch report # 42 p. 27. 
92 Swedwatch report # 42 p. 29ff. 
93 Swedwatch report # 42 p. 35f. 
94 Swedwatch report # 42 p. 35. 
95 Newmont mine on back-burner, Article in Chicago Tribune, 23 August 2012. 
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The investments in companies like Goldcorp and Newmont is what has caused the criticism 
against the AP-funds. After this presentation of the subjects, the next chapter contains the 
case study that will investigate whether these associations with human rights infringements is 
due to a failure to meet international standards of business and human rights.  
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3. The Case study 
In this chapter the case study will be carried out and by analysing the conduct of Sweden and 
the AP-funds an answer to the question posed in the introduction of the thesis will be sought.  
 
The chapter is divided into three sections, where the first part gives a more thorough 
background to the instrument used as a benchmark in the case study, the UN Guiding 
Principles. The section describes the work of John Ruggie during his mandate as SRSG and 
the Framework and Guiding Principles that became the outcome of this mandate.  
 
The second part is dedicated to the first Pillar of the Guiding Principles, the State duty to 
protect human rights. Under this headline Sweden’s conduct will be analysed with the 
provisions of Pillar I as the point of departure. This analysis does not aim to assess the how 
well the State fulfils its duty to protect in a general sense, since this lies outside the purpose of 
the thesis. The focus is on the actions taken with regard to the AP-funds. 
 
In the last part of the chapter the actions of the AP-funds concerning human rights 
considerations will be scrutinized to assess whether the Funds meet the requirements of Pillar 
II of the Guiding Principles.  
  
3.1 The UN Guiding Principles 
3.1.1 Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights 
When John Ruggie was first appointed SRSG in 2005 his initial mandate was to to identify 
and clarify existing standards and practices. When this was accomplished in 2007 the Human 
Rights Council invited the SRSG to submit recommendations, based on the findings in his 
research. For this purpose the mandate was renewed for an additional year.96  
 
The SRSG described the absence of an authoritative focal point in the business and human 
rights debate as an obstacle for progress. The debate was flooded with claims and counter-
claims. New initiatives emerged, involving diverse stakeholders, yet none of these efforts 
reached significant scale. As a result, laggards among States as well as companies could 
                                                
96 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011, p.3. 
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continue to avoid responsibility. After several multi-stakeholder consultations the SRSG draw 
the conclusion that even though the different stakeholder groups had disagreed on how an 
efficient governance regime should be formulated, they all expressed an urgent need for a 
common conceptual and policy framework. 97  Therefore Ruggie made only one 
recommendation in June 2008, that is, the Human Rights Council support the “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework, which he had developed. In its resolution 8/7 the Council 
unanimously endorsed the Framework, and by doing so provided the first authoritative focal 
point on the area.98 
 
The Framework rests on differentiated but complementary responsibilities and comprises 
three core principles; the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties 
including business, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and the need for more 
effective access to remedies. The Framework is described as a dynamic system of preventive 
and remedial measures where each pillar is an indispensable component. In the words of the 
SRSG each pillar is essential; “the State duty to protect because it lies at the very core of the 
international human rights regime; the corporate responsibility to respect because it is the 
basic expectation society has of business; and access to remedy, because even the most 
concerted efforts cannot prevent all abuse.”99 
 
3.1.2 The Guiding Principles: provisions, status and impact 
In the same resolution that endorsed the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, the 
Human Rights Council also extended John Ruggie’s mandate until June 2011. His mission for 
this third phase of the mandate was to operationalize the framework, by providing practical 
and concrete recommendations for its implementation.100 With the same inclusive approach 
that had been significant for the all work of the SRSG, through research and extensive 
consultations with all stakeholder groups, 31 Guiding Principles for Business and Human 
                                                
97 Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, p.4. 
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99 Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, p.4f. 
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Rights were developed. The Guiding Principles were unanimously endorsed by the Human 
Rights Council when presented in June 2011.101  
 
The endorsement of the Guiding Principles is considered an important breakthrough for the 
area of business and human rights. John Ruggie himself said that the endorsement of the 
Guiding Principles “will mark the end of the beginning, by establishing a common global 
platform for action on which cumulative progress can be built”102 And the OHCHR stated 
that the endorsement “…established the Guiding Principles as the global standard of practice 
that is now expected of all governments and businesses with regard to business and human 
rights.”103  
 
However, the Guiding Principles’ normative contribution to the governance regime of 
business and human rights lies not in the creation of new international law obligations. The 
general principles of the instrument states that “Nothing in these Guiding Principles should 
be read as creating new international law obligations, or as limiting or undermining any 
legal obligations a State may have undertaken or be subject to under international law with 
regard to human rights.”104 Instead the emphasis lies on guiding States’ and corporations’ 
behavior in operations with an impact on business and human rights, to adapt it to already 
existing standards. As Ruggie explains, the UN Guiding Principles contributes by elaborating 
on the implications of existing standards and practices for States and businesses; but also by 
identifying where the current regime falls short and how it should be improved.105 
 
Although being expectations and not obligations, the UN Guiding Principles can still prove 
important to area of business and human rights. Both the Framework and the UN Guiding 
Principles have gained extensive support from governments, businesses and civil society. The 
principles have been employed by individual governments and implemented by businesses 
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moreover a number of organizations have drawn upon both the Framework and the UN 
Guiding Principles when developing their own initiatives on business and human rights.106 
 
One example is the OECD that in 2011 updated its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and added a new chapter regarding human rights and business, which is consistent with the 
UN Guiding Principles.107 As previously mentioned these Guidelines are not legally binding 
either, so even though the provisions of the Framework and the UN Guiding Principles can be 
found within the Guidelines, that does not change the legal status of these provisions. 
However, a certain importance should be given to this fact. The ideas becoming generally 
accepted and recovered in several international instruments will undoubtedly stress the 
implementation and compliance. 
 
Another actor showing interest in the UN Guiding Principles is the European Commission. 
The Commission has outlined the improvement of the European Union’s (EU) CSR policy as 
one of the key concepts to achieve the EU’s treaty objective of sustainable development and 
highly competitive social market economy.108 In a communication from October 2011 the 
Commission presents a new strategy containing commitments for the Commission itself, as 
well as suggestions for enterprises, Member States and other stakeholder groups. One of the 
sections of the new strategy is dedicated to the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles. 
Among the measures for implementation is an intention to publish a report by the end of 2012 
on EU priorities in the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles and after that issue 
periodic reports on the progress; a call to all Member States to develop national plans for the 
implementation; and the expectation that all European enterprises meet the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, as defined in the UN Guiding Principles.109 
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3.2 Pillar I – State Duty to Protect 
The first pillar of the Framework and the Guiding Principles contains the State duty to protect 
against human rights abuses. In the Guiding Principles the duty to protect is divided in two 
categories of obligations, to adopt regulations to prevent human rights abuses and to 
adjudicate abuses that take place. The adjudication of abuses is being addressed in the third 
pillar of the Guiding Principles. Hence, the first pillar primarily lists provisions focusing on 
the policy and regulatory functions of the State. 
 
The State duty to protect represents the very core of the human rights regime and is, in a 
general sense, well understood and of little controversy. Whereas many claims about business 
and human rights are deeply contested, the state duty to protect is firmly established in 
international law, generally agreed to exist under customary international law and the treaty 
bodies to the core UN human rights treaties unanimously affirms that this duty require states 
to regulate and adjudicate abuses committed by non-state actors. 110 Nevertheless, the 
understanding of how the duty should be fulfilled with respect to business activities is far less 
developed and the SRSG is of the opinion that it should be viewed as an urgent policy priority 
for governments.111  
 
There is however aspects of the State duty to protect that have caused a lot of controversy, 
one such issue is the question whether this duty is extraterritorially applicable. Due to the fact 
that the human rights infringements associated with the AP-funds have occurred outside the 
national borders of Sweden, the question of extraterritoriality is of great significance for this 
investigation. Many of the criticized investments are made in companies operating in 
developing countries where the state is either unwilling or incapable of fulfilling its duty to 
protect. In these governance gaps human rights abuses are very likely to take place. For that 
reason the question of States extraterritorial responsibility for human rights will be discussed, 
before continuing to the evaluation of Sweden’s fulfilment of Pillar I in the UN Guiding 
Principles.  
 
                                                
110 SRSG Report, A/HRC/4/035, 19 Feb 2007 p.5ff. 
111 A Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, p.9. 
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3.2.1 Is the State Duty to Protect extraterritorially applicable?  
Human rights are universal rights - even so, the understanding of this concept has for long 
been quite one-sided. While all right-holders are considered to have rights everywhere based 
on international law, duty-bearers, that usually are states, do not have the same obligations 
with regard to individuals everywhere. This perception has recently been questioned by a 
number of actors in the international community, such as policymakers, NGOs, academics 
and international institutions. The question now being raised is whether states breach their 
legal obligations if their actions or omissions result in human rights violations abroad.112  
 
There are a number of scholars advocating the existence of extraterritorial obligations, one of 
them is Sigrun Skogly. According to Skogly, the fact that States’ extraterritorial obligations 
often have been ignored does not signify that these obligations are non-existent or lack a legal 
foundation. To prove this statement she draws on the UN Charter, concluding that in order to 
achieve “international co-operation”, which is listed as one of the organisation’s purposes in 
article 1(3), states are required to contribute outside their national territory. She also refers to 
articles 55 and 56, which provide that the UN shall promote universal respect for, and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and that this shall be done in 
joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization. Furthermore some of the 
specific human rights treaties have provisions that either give specific content to 
extraterritorial obligations or have been interpreted to contain such obligations. Especially 
important among these treaties are the ICESCR, CRC and CRPD.113 
 
One example of an institution that is promoting the idea of extraterritorial obligations is the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee has stated that all 
levels of obligations, to respect, to protect and to fulfil apply to extraterritorial obligations. In 
the General Comment 15, on the right to water, the Committee confirms that “international 
obligations includes that steps should be taken by State parties to prevent their own citizens 
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113 ibid p. 76ff. 
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and companies from violating the right to water of individuals and communities in other 
countries”114  
 
It is especially with regard to the economic, social and cultural rights that extra territorial 
obligations are being discussed. In 2011 a group of experts from universities and 
organizations around the world wrote and adopted the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from 
2011. This instrument does not provide any legally binding obligations, but is based on legal 
research conducted during a decade and intends to clarify the content of extraterritorial State 
obligations to realize economic, social and cultural rights.115 The Maastricht Principles 
proclaims that all States have obligations to protect, respect and fulfil human rights, including 
civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, both within their territories and 
extraterritorially. The commentary to the principles maintain that these duties are implied in a 
number of recognized instruments and refer to similar provisions as Skogly did when 
explaining extraterritorial obligations.116 Interesting to notice, considering the question in 
focus of this thesis, is that the Maastricht Principles expect States to regulate the conduct of 
private actors to ensure that their conduct does not result in violating human rights and that 
this obligation extends to situations where the human rights violations occur on the territory 
of another state.117 It is however important to bear in mind that these principles are still 
controversial and have both supporters and opponents. 
 
The question of extraterritorial obligations have also been analysed specifically in relation to 
business and human rights. In 2006 Olivier De Schutter, one of the authors of the Maastricht 
Principles, presented a study that had the purpose to examine under which circumstances 
States should exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction on companies domiciled within their 
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territory for human rights abuses committed abroad. The study was conducted in support of 
the mandate of John Ruggie.118  
 
In this report published five years before the Maastricht Principles, De Schutter explains that 
the current state of law does not clearly recognise extraterritorial duties to protect. However 
he continued by stating that this is a view that might be changing, especially concerning 
economic and social rights. He traced this change of view to the growing understanding of the 
interdependency of States, something that should lead to State obligations being extended.119 
De Schutter finished his report with the conclusion that there is a need for new instruments to 
clarify and where necessary extend the State obligation to protect.120 
 
When John Ruggie then presented his Framework in 2008 his assessment of the current 
situation was similar to that of De Schutter, and he concluded that experts still disagreed on 
whether international law requires home States to help prevent human rights abuses abroad, 
when they are a result of the conduct of companies based within their territory. The 
Framework underscores that States are not prohibited from doing so, where a recognized 
basis of jurisdiction exists provided that their actions don’t interfere with the principle of non-
intervention.121  
 
Being a guide for implementation of the Framework, the UN Guiding Principles reflect the 
same approach to extraterritorial obligations and this explains why the duty to protect is only 
required within the States territory and, something that is clearly stated in Principle 1. This 
position is definitely defendable. Even scholars that advocate the recognition of 
extraterritorial obligations concede that uncertainties remain as to what extent the obligations 
already exist in international law and what such obligations imply. There is also a strong 
resistance from developed countries, disputing these obligations that they regard as an 
extension of existing duties.  
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The question of extraterritorial obligations is still controversial, disputed and not yet 
crystallized in international law. Ruggie has clearly stated that the intention of the UN 
Guiding Principles is not to create new standards, but to provide for guidance with regard to 
standards that already exist. With these preconditions, a requirement for States to implement 
their duty to protect extraterritorially might have meant a step over that line. Considering the 
resistance from States, refraining from extraterritorial obligations might also have been 
decisive for the unanimous endorsement in the Human Rights Council, which of course was 
of great importance for the credibility of this instrument.  
 
Nevertheless, the decision to limit the reach of the duty to protect has also received strong 
criticism, in particular from human rights groups. One could also have wished for Ruggie to 
be bolder in this regard, irrespective of the objection that the UN Guiding Principles should 
not create new standard. There is an opening to argue for the existence of these obligations, as 
described above, which would allow the Guiding Principles to include these obligations, 
claiming it to be a reflection of existing provisions. There are big expectations on the UN 
Guiding Principles to provide a modern and functional instrument for the area of business and 
human rights. However, the position taken in the question of extraterritoriality can hardly be 
seen as very progressive. Even the more expectant reports on the issue foresee a development 
where State obligations will have to be extended as a result of increasing global 
interdependency.  
 
Regardless of the opinion one might have regarding the answer that Ruggie gave to the 
question of extraterritorial reach for the State duty to protect, it is clear that the Guiding 
Principles do not impose extraterritorial obligations on States. This sets a frame for the 
analysis I am intending to do in the following chapter, making it harder to criticise the State 
for the extraterritorial violations of human rights associated with the AP-funds, at least on 
basis of non-compliance with the UN Guiding Principles.  
 
Still, the fact that the UN Guiding Principles do not place direct extraterritorial obligations on 
States does not render them worthless as an instrument to prevent adverse effects on human 
rights enjoyment outside the national territory. Although not requiring States to regulate the 
way businesses domiciled within their territory operates abroad – the UN Guiding Principles 
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strongly advise States to at least set out expectations on businesses to respect human rights in 
all their operations, especially where the State itself is involved in or supports the business. 
And the effects of an effective regulation of the conduct of businesses with regard to human 
rights are likely to have an impact on the whole business actor, something that in turn 
hopefully spills over on its operations abroad. 
 
3.2.2 The Guiding Principles regarding the State Duty to Protect  
Pillar I of the Guiding Principles consists of ten principles, covering different aspects of 
policymaking and different situations when considerations of business and human rights are 
of importance. For the purpose of this thesis, Swedish policies will be discussed in relation to 
five of these principles.  Without a doubt, the remaining principles would form equally 
interesting issues for analysis, but since they are of little relevance for the question of the 
regulation of the AP-funds, they are not included. 
 
3.2.2.1 Foundational Principles 
Principle 1 proclaims that States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory 
and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including businesses. Through effective policies, 
legislation, regulations and adjudication appropriate steps are to be taken to prevent, 
investigate, punish and redress such abuse.122 
 
As the commentary to the principle explains, States are not per se responsible for human 
rights abuses by private actors. Nonetheless, if the abuse can be attributed to the State or the 
State has failed to take appropriate steps to prevent the abuse this could constitute a breach of 
the State’s international human rights law obligations. To assure that such a breach is not 
committed, the State should consider the full range of permissible preventative and remedial 
measures.123 
 
This first principle sets a broad standard for the types of measures that are to be taken, but 
limits the applicability to the jurisdiction of the State. As to compensate for this, the second 
principle concerns the situation of businesses situated within one State that conducts 
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operations in other States and places a responsibility on the “home state” of the business 
entity. However, the requirements in principle 2 differ profoundly from those stated in 
principle 1. Whereas the State must protect against human rights abuses within their territory, 
the exhortation in principle 2 is that States should announce their expectations on businesses 
to respect human rights. According to Principle 2 “States should set out clearly the 
expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction 
respect human rights throughout their operations”. 124  This could be achieved through 
domestic measures with extraterritorial implications, multilateral soft law instruments such as 
the OECD Guidelines are mentioned as an example.125  
 
3.2.2.2 Operational Principles 
Three of the operational principles will also be discussed in this case study, namely principles 
3, 4 and 8. The third principle elaborates on the regulatory and policy functions of the State. 
To meet their duty to protect, States are required to enforce laws with the aim and effect to 
make business actors respect human rights law. At the same time, it is equally important that 
other laws directed to business entities does not constrain but enable business respect for 
human rights. Principle 3 also calls on States to provide effective guidance to business actors 
on how they should act to respect human rights throughout their operations. As a last 
requirement States are also demanded to encourage, and where appropriate require, business 
actors to report and communicate how they address their human rights impact.126 
 
Principle 4 is of particular relevance to the question at issue, as it targets business actors that 
are owned or controlled by the State. The principle declares that States should take additional 
steps to protect against human rights abuse by these actors.127 The commentary once again 
underlines the risk for the State to breach their international law obligations since the conduct 
of the owned or controlled business actor could be attributed to the State. But it is not only the 
risk of breaching international law that motivates an increased effort. The commentary also 
establishes that “the closer a business enterprise is to the state, or the more it relies on 
statutory authority or taxpayer support, the stronger the State’s policy rationale becomes for 
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ensuring that the enterprise respects human rights”.128 Something that should indicate very 
strong policy rationales for Sweden to ensure that the AP-funds really respect human rights, 
given that the operations of the Funds consist in investing the taxpayers’ money.  
 
The commentary also points out that States have various and powerful means to control 
businesses under their ownership or control. These business actors typically report to State 
agencies, and government departments have a greater scope for scrutiny and oversight, which 
gives the State the possibility to ensure the implementation of effective human rights due 
diligence.129 
 
The last principle in focus from Pillar I is principle 8 which has the purpose to safeguard 
policy coherence. The principle require States to ensure that governmental departments, 
agencies and other institutions that shape business practices are aware and observe human 
rights when fulfilling their mandates.130 States are called upon to establish both vertical and 
horizontal domestic policy coherence. Vertical policy coherence implies that States have the 
necessary policies, laws and processes to implement their human rights obligations. Whereas 
horizontal policy coherence means that States must assure that all actors that shape business 
practices are well informed and act in compliance with the human rights obligations of the 
State.131  
 
3.2.3 Sweden’s compliance with Pillar I 
For the purpose of this evaluation of Sweden’s compliance with the provisions provided in 
Pillar I of the UN Guiding Principles the legislation, regulations and policies issued by the 
State and of principal importance to the AP-funds will be analysed. This includes the Swedish 
Public Pension Funds Act from 2000 and The Sixth AP-fund’s Act from 2000 (hereafter The 
Pension Funds Acts), with adherent preparatory works. Subsequently the government 
investigation regarding the AP-funds, SOU 2008:107, will be scrutinized since it contains 
proposals of new regulations of the AP-funds.  
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Another important control mechanism of the AP-funds is the annual report from the 
government to the Parliament. The annual government report is motivated as a way to balance 
the autonomy of the Funds and to fulfil the obligation of the government to give an impartial 
assessment of the results of the Funds.132 Therefore the latest year report, concerning the 
operations of the AP-funds during 2011, and the parliament bills that followed are also 
included in this evaluation. Finally the policy statement Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s 
policy for Global Development will be discussed. 
 
3.3.3.1 Legislation – Swedish Public Pension Funds Act  
The legislation of the AP-funds is the most important mechanism for regulation, since it is the 
only way for the State to directly place obligations on the AP-funds. (See discussion on the 
Status of the AP-funds, section 2.2.1). What is most striking with this legislation, when 
evaluating its efficiency as an instrument to regulate business respect for human rights, is the 
complete absence of references to human rights or other ethical considerations. Neither one of 
the Pension Funds Acts have any provisions addressing these issues.133 The only reference is 
instead found in the proposition to the law, that constitutes a part of the preparatory works and 
is the foundation of the legislation. In the section describing the overall objectives of the AP-
funds, a statement regarding ethics in the investment operations has been added. According to 
this statement “The AP-funds should take environmental and ethical considerations into 
account in their investment activities without deviating from the overall objective of a high 
rate of return”134 
 
First of all it is of importance to compare this vague statement with the UN Guiding 
Principles that calls on States to protect against human rights abuses by businesses through 
effective policies, legislation and regulations and to clearly set out expectations that 
businesses should respect human rights throughout their operations.135 Whether the quoted 
statement really does this can be questioned. The ambiguity of a statement where ethical 
considerations should be taken into account but at the same time always be subordinated to 
the objective of a high rate of return can hardly be considered to set out the clear expectation 
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asked for in Principle 2, or a policy that has the effect of obliging businesses to respect human 
rights, which Principle 3 (a) requires States to enforce - at least not without guidance on how 
to balance these two principles. 
 
Effective guidance for businesses on how to respect human rights throughout their operations 
is also something required of States according to Principle 3 (c). And guidance was also 
required by one of the AP-funds, asking the legislator to specify and concretize the statement 
and to provide guidance on how to weigh the different considerations against each other.136 
The government chose not to meet this demand, and neither the law nor the preparatory works 
contains any guidance on this matter. Instead the responsibility for the interpretation of the 
statement is placed with the boards of the different AP-funds.137 
 
To meet their duty to protect, States should moreover use their regulatory functions to require 
businesses to communicate how they address their human rights impacts, according to 
Principle 3 (d). Any requirements of that kind are not visible in the wording of the Public 
Pension Funds Act.138 However, the preparatory works encourages the Funds to show how 
considerations of ethics and environment are incorporated in the investment policy that the 
Funds have to present. How this is to be presented is not further specified, but instead left to 
the Funds to decide. The only explicit direction in this regard is that the Funds should, in their 
annual report, show how they have handled the administration of resources for these 
considerations. The purpose of this direction is to verify that these considerations have not 
had a negative impact on the overall objective of high rates of return.139 
 
After the government investigation that presented its proposals in 2008 some improvements 
in this respect has been made, which will be analysed under next section. Interesting to note 
nonetheless, is that since 2007 all Swedish state-owned companies are required to submit an 
annual sustainability report that is to be independently verified. The sustainability should 
follow the internationally recognized Global Reporting Initiative framework, which includes 
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provisions for reporting on the area of human rights.140 But in this context the AP-funds are 
defined solely as government agencies, and therefore not included among the businesses that 
have to submit GRI reports.141 
 
3.2.3.2 The Government Investigation – SOU 2008:107  
In 2007 the government appointed a committee with the mission to evaluate the AP-funds 
work with ethical and environmental considerations in their operations and bring forward 
suggestions of improvements. The results of the investigation were presented in their final 
report “SOU 2008:107 Etiken, miljön och pensionerna”.142  
 
Many of the committee’s proposals are directed to the AP-funds, but since this part of the 
case study has the purpose of evaluating whether the State fulfils its duty to protect with 
regard to its policy and regulatory functions, I’ll focus on the treatment that these proposals 
received from the government and the parliament. The government decided not to start a 
legislation process; instead it presented its view on the proposals in their annual report to the 
parliament.143  
 
The first proposal presented in SOU 2008:107 was that environmental and ethical 
considerations should be included in the laws regulating the AP-funds.144 A proposal that is in 
line with the requirements placed on the State according to the UN Guiding Principles.145  
However, this has not yet led to any measures being taken; the government postponed the 
matter and did not comment further on the possibilities for that kind of provision to be 
included in the law, neither did the finance committee of the parliament.146 As mentioned 
under chapter 2.2.4, the question was brought up again in the final report of the Buffer Fund 
Inquiry. The inquiry disagreed with the proposal in SOU 2008:107 and opposed a change of 
the law to incorporate ethical considerations.147 It is still too early to conclude whether a 
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change of the legislation in this regard will take place, the final report of the inquiry is 
currently under consideration and has not yet lead to a proposition of a new legislation. 
 
Among the proposals that were not considered to require a change of legislation are 
recommendations on how to improve the State’s assessment of the Funds ethical and 
environmental work, but also recommendations to require the Funds to communicate how 
they address their impact on environment and human rights.148 Both these issues are featured 
as a part of the State duty to protect in the UN Guiding Principles.149 The SOU 2008:107 
recommended that the annual reports from the government to the parliament should also 
include an assessment of the ethical and environmental work being carried out by the Funds 
within their operations, except for the financial assessment already being done.150 The 
parliament approved of that recommendation and stated that it assumes that the government 
would include these aspects in its annual report, something that has been done ever since.151 
 
As one of several recommendations to ensure public confidence in the AP-funds, the SOU 
2008:107 recommended that the Funds should conduct an open and transparent 
communication towards the public and that this should include reporting on how they address 
their human rights impacts.152 The government acknowledges that open and transparent 
communication regarding the operations will promote the credibility of the Funds and is 
therefore an important demand on the Funds.153 Although not commenting specifically on the 
communication of measures taken to address human rights impacts, this acknowledgement is 
probably as close as the State had gotten to fulfil the duty stated in principle 3 (d) of the UN 
Guiding Principles and officially encourage the AP-funds to communicate how they address 
human rights impact at that point. 
 
 
                                                
148 SOU 2008:107 p. 10ff. 
149 Compare Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - Principle 3 (a) and 3 (d). 
150 SOU 2008:107 p. 13. 
151 Finansutskottets betänkande 2008/09:FiU6 – AP-fondernas verksamhet tom 2007, p. 20ff. 
152 SOU 2008:107 p. 89f. 
153 Skrivelse 2008/09:130 p. 77. 
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3.2.3.3 The Government’s Annual Report and Evaluation of the AP-funds  
The most important instrument for the government and the parliament to exert an influence on 
the conduct of the AP-funds on a recurrent basis is the annual report and evaluation of the 
Funds operations during the year. Since 2009 these reports contain an evaluation of the Funds’ 
guidelines for environmental and ethical considerations within their operations.154 This gives 
the government an opportunity to criticize the conduct of the Funds and give 
recommendations for improvement. The report and evaluation is also debated in the 
parliament and in connection to that parliament bills with proposals regarding the AP-funds 
are submitted. If approved, the parliament bills might lead to a change of the legislation. 
 
This year’s report, Skr 2011/12:130, does not contain a lot of information of interest for the 
discussion regarding Pillar I of the UN Guiding Principles. The government wrote a statement 
proclaiming that the AP-funds conduct a commendable work developing guidelines for 
ethical and environmental considerations. The government particularly encourages the effort 
to incorporate these considerations in the running administration and analysis.155 Of interest 
for the discussion regarding principle 3(d), is that the government once again addresses the 
issue of communication regarding the work of the AP-funds. This time however, 
communication concerning ethical considerations is explicitly mentioned and the government 
refers to this as a demand rather than a recommendation.156 
 
The report from the government has been considered in the Finance committee of the 
parliament and was approved, in a decision taken by the parliament in December 2012 
without any amendments. However, for the sake of this analysis it is more interesting to look 
at the decisions that weren’t taken and the proposals that weren’t approved of. In connection 
to the annual report of the AP-funds operations a number of parliament bills were submitted, 
out of which six addressed different aspects of ethical considerations in the AP-funds 
operations. Among the proposals put forward in these bills are a call for adapting the ethical 
guidelines of the Funds to the policy statement “Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s policy for 
Global Development” (which will be further discussed in the next section), to appoint an 
independent committee to scrutinize the ethical and environmental work of the AP-funds and 
                                                
154 Compare 2008/09:FiU6, p. 20ff. 
155 Regeringens skrivelse 2011/12:130 p. 64 ff. 
156 Regeringens skrivelse 2011/12:130 p. 68. 
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to require that the Funds develop clear criteria and guidelines for how to handle companies 
that violate international conventions.157  Another parliament bill requests a parliamentary 
commission of inquiry to investigate how the legislation and governing policies should be 
changed in order to allow the Funds to take ethical and environmental considerations into 
account to higher degree than what is possible today.158 This approach sets the tone for yet 
another parliament bill, opposing the present policy that economic returns considerations are 
to be superior to ethical considerations.159 
 
From the referred proposals I draw the conclusion that there is a political will to make a 
greater effort to ensure that the AP-funds take ethics and human rights into consideration 
throughout their operations and that their conduct live up to expectations in international 
instruments. Unfortunately this does not seem to be the will of the majority of the parliament 
members.   
 
3.2.3.4 Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s policy for Global Development 
The policy statement “Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s policy for Global Development” was 
adopted in 2003. 160  Adopting this kind of policy, that underlines the importance of 
incorporating human rights considerations in all policy areas and calls for a closer 
collaboration between all sectors of society corresponds well with the requirement to ensure 
policy coherence, stated in principle 8 of the Guiding Principles.  
 
Accordingly it is not the content that might constitute the problem in this case but rather the 
applicability of the policy to the AP-funds. The Ethic council working with these 
considerations on behalf of AP-funds 1-4 ensures that the values of the AP-funds are in line 
with Sweden’s policy for Global Development, although emphasizing that these 
considerations are taken into account without deviating from the overall objective of a high 
rate of return.161 Britta Hammar, responsible for the AP-funds at the finance department goes 
even further and dismisses the possibility that Sweden’s policy for Global Development 
                                                
157 Parliament bill from the Green Party/Miljöpartiet, Motion 2011/12:Fi21. 
158 Parliament bill from the Left Party/Vänsterpartiet, Motion 2012/13: Fi206. 
159 Parliament bill from the Green Party/Miljöpartiet, Motion 2012/13:Fi225. 
160 Regeringens skrivelse 2007/08:109 p. 7f. 
161 Statement on the official homepage  - http://www.ap4.se/etikradet/Etikradet.aspx?id=928 
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would be applicable to the AP-funds. Since the AP-funds are to be solely regulated through 
legislation and the legislation is not compatible with the demands of the Global Development 
Policy, the legislation must prevail.162  
 
An exclusion of the AP-funds from the applicability of the Global Development Policy will 
undoubtedly impair the aim of the policy to implement these provisions in all policy areas and 
to influence all actors with an impact on the Global Development. Furthermore such 
exclusion gives a reason to question Sweden’s compliance with principle 8 of the UN 
Guiding Principles. 
 
3.2.4 Discussion and preliminary conclusions regarding Pillar I 
The provisions of Pillar I emphasises that the responsibility for a State to regulate the actions 
of a business actors is stronger in cases where the business actor is owned, controlled or in 
other ways associated with the State. At the same time the possibility, scope and incentive 
also becomes stronger in these situations. Since this is the case of the relationship between 
Sweden and the AP-funds, it should be a prioritized situation for the State.  
 
However, it can be questioned whether the State meets the requirements presented in the UN 
Guiding Principles. The provisions of Pillar I focus on the responsibility of the State to 
regulate and provide guidance to the business actors, and in this regard Sweden seems to fall 
short in the case of the AP-funds. The legislation governing the Funds do not contain any 
provision requiring the Funds to respect human rights and the statement provided in the 
preparatory works stating that the AP-funds should take due account to ethical considerations 
without deviating from the overall objective of high returns is very ambiguous. Furthermore 
the government has not provided any guidance on how this statement should be interpreted 
and implemented, even though it has been demanded for.   
 
Regarding other requirements of Pillar I progress have been made during the last years. The 
government has started to assess the ethical work of the Funds on an annual basis, which is 
one of the requirements in Principle 3. Another improvement is that the government now 
require the AP-funds to communicate how they address their human rights impacts, even 
                                                
162 Swedfund report # 42 p. 58. 
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though it can be noticed that the AP-funds are not obliged to report according to GRI, which 
all state-owned companies must do.  
 
When making a general evaluation of Sweden and the fulfilment of Pillar I the positive 
aspects consist of these improvements and the fact that these questions are on the agenda, as 
showed by a number of recent government investigations addressing ethical considerations in 
the operations of the AP-funds. There is also a lively debate in the parliament and 
propositions that would improve the complicity of Pillar I has been submitted, although not 
yet approved of. 
 
There are other aspects that give reason to criticise the State in this case. The lack of guidance 
for these issues is remarkable considering the close association between the Funds and the 
State. The factor I consider being of most importance is however the statement that requires 
the AP-funds to take ethical considerations into account, and the way this statement is 
formulated. As has already been discussed it is a vague and ambiguous statement that hardly 
can be said to fulfil the requirements of principle 2 and 3 in Pillar I. Even though it is unclear 
it still provides the most authoritative regulation of the AP-funds and their ethical 
considerations and therefore sets the standard. The apprehension is that a policy as 
unenthusiastic and reluctant will be followed by equally unenthusiastic and reluctant 
measures. The fact that the statement stresses that ethical considerations are to be 
subordinated to the overall objective of a high rate of return will have consequences for the 
way the Funds implement their ethical considerations, something that is investigated in the 
following part of the case study. 
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3.3 Pillar II – Corporate Responsibility 
 
The second pillar of the Framework and the UN Guiding Principles addresses business actors 
and collects a number of principles with the aim of ensuring the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights. The instruments define corporate responsibility to protect as a 
responsibility for businesses to “act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of 
others and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved.”163 Whereas many other 
instruments have tried to identify a limited set of rights for which business actors should bear 
responsibility the Framework and UN Guiding Principles states that business actors should 
consider all rights, since they may impact them all.164 
 
To conduct the analysis regarding this pillar one must take into consideration what kind of 
actor the AP-funds represent. According to the UN Guiding Principles, the provisions of 
Pillar II apply to all business actors, regardless of size, sector, location, ownership and 
structure.165 This implies that also institutional investors with the legal status of a government 
agency, such as the AP-funds, are to fulfil these provisions.  
 
A consequence of this broad spectrum of stakeholders is the difficulty of constructing 
provisions that adequately address the very diverse adverse effects to human rights enjoyment 
that might derive from the different kinds of business actors. John Ruggie acknowledged this 
problem in his final report and concluded that the means by which the principles are realized 
must be adapted to the different circumstances of the specific situation, since one size does 
not fit all in terms of implementation of the principles.166 
 
The problem with formulating provisions that will cover all types of business actors is of 
immediate importance in the case of institutional investors. The UN Guiding Principles have 
been criticized for failing to recognize the importance of institutional investors in order to 
achieve respect for human rights. Rory Sullivan and Nicolas Hahcez consider that the 
principles are incapable of providing guidance to institutional investors and ensure that these 
                                                
163 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, p. 4. 
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actors use their powers and influence to improve human rights compliance.167 According to 
Radu Mares the SRSG fell short of a fuller understanding of the responsibilities of investors 
and Mares considers Ruggie’s treatment in this area to be tentative.168  
 
It is apparent when reading the provisions of Pillar II that the business actors in mind when 
constructing the principles have not primarily been institutional investors. Many of the 
provisions of Pillar II are applicable in situations where the operations of a business actor 
have or may have a direct impact on the human rights enjoyment of a stakeholder. This is 
very seldom the case for the AP-funds, or other institutional investors, since their impact on 
the human rights enjoyment is generally of indirect character.  This analysis will only draw on 
the principles that are applicable to the AP-funds.  
 
One important aspect of Pillar II is the requirement to take appropriate action to prevent and 
mitigate adverse human rights impacts. What appropriate action consists of regarding 
institutional investors is not defined in the UN Guiding Principles and a comparison with the 
UN Principles of Responsible Investments (UNPRI) has therefore been made. The UNPRI is 
a voluntary initiative backed by the UN, where an international network of investors work to 
incorporate environmental and social considerations in investment practices. UNPRI has 
quickly become the leading global network for responsible investment.169 Many of the 
provisions featured in the UNPRI correlate with the requirements of the UN Guiding 
Principles, but are especially drawn up for institutional investors. The description of 
appropriate action in UNPRI is therefore a good benchmark for the analysis of the actions 
taken by the AP-funds.  
 
Before conducting the analysis the first issue that will be addressed is whether the corporate 
responsibility to protect is legally binding according to international law. As described in the 
introduction to this thesis the question whether there are legally binding human rights 
obligations applicable to business actors has been much debated. The purpose is not to offer a 
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complete investigation of this controversial question, but at least clarify the position taken in 
the UN guiding principles, since this provides the foundation and sets a frame for the analysis. 
Subsequently the evaluation of the AP-funds compliance with the provisions of Pillar II will 
follow. 
 
3.3.1 Are there any international legally binding obligations in the business and human 
rights area? 
The first mission for John Ruggie as SRSG was to shed some light on the existing governing 
regime, and provide a comprehensive mapping of current international standards and practices 
regarding business and human rights.170 Except for mapping voluntary initiatives and describe 
existing soft law instruments that also included reflecting upon the position taken in the Draft 
Norms and provide an answer to the delicate question on whether the body of human rights 
law is directly applicable to corporations. 
 
In the report “Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility 
and Accountability for Corporate Acts” presented to the Human Rights Council in 2007 the 
question is thoroughly investigated and responded with a firm no. In the report Ruggie 
discusses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its preamble which states that 
“every individual and every organ of society…shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance.”171 The 
quotation has often been used by proponents of the idea that corporations have directly legally 
binding obligations under human rights law, with the argument that the UDHR is 
acknowledged as customary international law.172  
 
Ruggie confirms that many UDHR provisions have entered customary international law, but 
considers it generally agreed that the preamble is not included. He also draws attention to the 
fact that even though most of its provisions have been incorporated in the Covenants and 
other UN human rights treaties and that corporate responsibility is often recognized in the 
                                                
170 SRSG Report, A/HRC/4/035, 19 Feb 2007, p.4f. 
171 UN General Assembly Resolution, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), 
preamble. 
172 SRSG Report, A/HRC/4/035, 19 Feb 2007, p.11f. 
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preambles of these instruments, the issue is never explicitly addressed in any of the 
operational paragraphs. Furthermore he scrutinizes how direct corporate responsibility for 
human rights is being understood in the core ILO conventions and the most important 
regional instruments on human rights. Although detecting some ambiguities, Ruggie 
concludes that the international human rights instruments currently do not impose direct legal 
obligations on corporations.173 
 
While rejecting the idea of direct legal obligations on corporations, the report underlines the 
indirect legal obligations on corporations pursuant to the state duty to protect. The report 
proclaims that “the state duty to protect against non-state abuses is part of the international 
human rights regime’s very foundation.”174 Whereas the State duty to protect is assigned to 
the international human rights regime, Ruggie explains the business responsibility to derive 
from the basic expectation society has of business, and not legally binding obligations.175  
Consequently the UN Guiding Principles, that only sets out to reflect existing standards and 
obligations, do not imply legally binding human rights obligations for business actors. 
 
3.3.2 The Guiding Principles regarding the Corporate Responsibility to Respect  
According to the Framework and the UN Guiding Principles the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights includes avoiding complicity, where complicity refers to an indirect 
involvement by a business actor in human rights abuses.176 This is the kind of involvement 
that the AP-funds have been accused of. Complicity has both a legal and a non-legal meaning. 
The instruments compare legal complicity with standards for aiding and abetting in 
international criminal law, which means that a business actor would need to knowingly 
provide practical assistance or encouragement that has substantial effect on the commission of 
a human rights abuse in order to call it legal complicity.177 However a business actor may also 
be non-legally complicit in the acts of another party, in the case where the business actor are 
seen to benefit from an abuse committed by that party.178 This situation can be applied on 
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most institutional investors investing in companies that commit human rights abuses. And 
even though this most likely would not lead to legal process it should still be avoided.  
 
According to the foundational principles of Pillar II all business actors should avoid causing 
or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, but also seek to 
mitigate and prevent adverse human rights impacts that could be linked to them even if they 
have not contributed to these impacts.179 Since the AP-funds generally impact human rights 
indirectly this will be the focus of this analysis. In order to meet the responsibility to respect 
human rights there are three categories of measures to be taken: there should be a policy 
commitment, a due-diligence process and a process to enable remediation.180 However, Pillar 
II does not require business actors to provide for remediation unless they are the actor causing 
or contributing directly to the adverse effects.181 Since this is not the case in the current 
situation of the AP-funds, these requirements will not be further analysed. 
 
The content of the three categories are exhaustively described in the operational principles. 
Principle 18 contains the requirement of a human rights policy that calls on business actors to 
express their commitment to respect human rights in a statement of policy. This statement 
should be approved by the highest level and stipulate the human rights expectations of 
business partners, personnel and other parties linked to the business actor. It should also be 
publically available and communicated internally and externally. Furthermore the content of 
the statement should be reflected in operational policies and similar.182  
 
The due-diligence process consists of several different steps. The first step is to identify and 
assess any actual or potential adverse human rights impact with which the business actor may 
be involved.183 The information obtained should thereafter be integrated across relevant 
internal functions and processes and appropriate action should be taken in order to prevent 
and mitigate the adverse human rights impacts. An effective integration requires that the 
responsibility for addressing adverse impacts is assigned to the appropriate level within the 
                                                
179 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – Principle 13. 
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organisation of the business actor. The integration must also be enabled by internal decision-
making and budget allocations.184  
 
What appropriate action means will of course differ, depending on what type of actor and 
adverse effects on human rights that have occurred. The UN Guiding Principles states that 
when the impacts are indirect, the appropriate actions will also depend on the extent of 
leverage. Leverage is considered to exist when the business actor has the ability to effect 
change in the practices of the entity that causes the adverse effects to human rights. In 
situations where the business actor has leverage to prevent or mitigate adverse impact, the 
leverage should be exercised. However, if the business actor lacks leverage to do this, and is 
unable to increase the leverage the commentary to this principle proclaims that the business 
actor should consider ending the relationship.185 
 
When comparing this with the UNPRI that especially targets institutional investors, several 
similarities are found.  UNPRI encourages investors to build their capabilities of leverage and 
participate in engagement initiatives with other investors since this increases their possibilities 
to impact the companies in which they invest. The recommended way to take appropriate 
action for institutional investors in to prevent and mitigate adverse impacts is to be an active 
owner, according to the UNPRI. This includes exercising voting rights and file shareholder 
resolutions consistent with environmental and ethical considerations.186 
 
The final part of the due-diligence process for the business actors is to communicate how they 
address human rights impacts, particularly when concerns connected to their operations are 
raised.187  
 
3.3.3 The AP-funds’ compliance with Pillar II 
This section will evaluate how the AP-funds fulfil the provisions of Pillar II, presented in the 
previous section. To summarize, the categories to analyse are the following; Existence of a 
policy with regard to human rights, the conducting of a due-diligence process that identifies 
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and assesses adverse human rights impacts, integrates the findings in the operations, takes 
appropriate action to prevent and mitigate the adverse effects and finally communicates how 
the adverse effects are being addressed. 
 
The most important documents for the conduct of this evaluation are the ownership policies 
and policies for ethical considerations of all the AP-funds. Furthermore the last annual reports 
and ethical reports of the Funds will be analysed for an insight to the current and actual state 
of human rights considerations in the operations of the AP-funds. 
 
Since the AP-funds are independent and autonomous entities each Fund take their own 
decisions and have different strategies for their human rights work. Hence, every Fund have 
their own ownership policy – even though the different policies show many similarities when 
it comes to issues regarding ethical considerations. When it comes to the measures of taking 
action AP-funds 1-4 have chosen to collaborate regarding these issues through an Ethical 
council. The last annual report of the Ethical council will also be included in this evaluation.  
 
As a last part of this evaluation the actions taken by the AP-funds to mitigate the adverse 
human rights effects in illustrating cases, namely the Yanacocha mine in Peru and the Marlin 
mine in Guatemala, will be scrutinized.  
 
3.3.3.1 Policy commitment 
First of all it can be established that all AP-funds, clearly express their commitment to meet 
their responsibility to respect human rights in their ownership policies. The policies, which 
are approved by the Board of Directors of each Fund, are publicly available on their 
respective homepage.188 In addition, AP 3 has a special policy where values concerning 
ethical and environmental issues together with the methods of work in these questions are 
more thoroughly described.189 In this respect these Funds seem to meet the requirements of 
Guiding Principle 18. 
 
                                                
188 See Ownership policies of the AP-funds. 
189 AP 3’s Policy of environmental and ethical considerations. 
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The content of the policies of the other AP-funds, when it comes to questions of human rights 
commitments, shows many similarities. They all base their values on the values of the 
Swedish state as expressed in the Constitution and the international conventions ratified by 
Sweden. The policies also refer to international initiatives that have gained support from the 
Swedish government, such as the UN Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines. According 
to the policies these conventions, instruments and legislation should guide the Funds in their 
work to ensure that consideration to ethical and environmental aspects are taken in their 
operations.190 
 
Another important requirement to meet the demand of a policy commitment in principle 18 is 
to stipulate human rights expectations of other parties linked to their operations, in the case of 
the AP-funds the companies in which they invest are the most important actors to address. 
The ownership policies do express this kind of expectations. First of all it is stated that the 
Funds consider that the companies in which they invest have a responsibility of their own not 
to contribute to violations of international convention, regardless of whether these 
conventions are directed to state-actors or non-state actors, such as companies.191 Besides that 
the Funds have set different expectations on the companies, for example AP 2 encourages 
companies to follow both UN Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines. In addition the AP 
2 presents a list of international conventions, which it expects the companies to follow, and 
requires them to adopt a Code of Conduct that addresses ethics and environment.192 Without 
going into detail regarding every Fund and the expectations they set up, the conclusion of a 
comparison is that they differ a lot in content and how detailed the expectations are. In this 
regard the expectations presented by AP 2 are rich both in content and detail. On the other end 
of the scale is the AP 4 that does not explicitly state their expectations on the companies they 
invest in.193 
 
 
                                                
190See for example Ownership policy of AP-fund 1, p.9. 
191 See for example Ownership policy of AP-fund 1, p 8. 
192 Ownership policy of AP-fund 2, p.9. 
193 Compare Ownership policy of AP-fund 4, p.7. 
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3.3.3.2 Identify and Integrate 
The AP-funds also claim to be identifying and assessing adverse human rights impacts that 
they may be involved with. This represents the first step of the due-diligence process that 
Pillar II requires business actors to carry out. AP-funds 1-4 have entrusted the Ethical council 
with the task to examine the companies that they have invested in to identify and assess 
adverse human rights impacts. An external consultant carries out the examination and 
systematically monitors approximately 4200 companies that the Funds have made 
investments in. Incidents are reported back to the Ethical council that choses around 100-200 
companies to be further analysed by the consultant.194 It should be noted that the policies do 
not require the Funds to conduct this examination before taking the decision to make an 
investment, it is only applicable to companies that are already in the portfolio of the Funds. 
 
Since AP 7 stands outside the cooperation in the Ethical council the Fund carry out their own 
examination of companies they invest in. The Policy states that every company should be 
examined at least two times every year. However, the policy also mentions that it cannot be 
guaranteed that all the requirements listed will be fulfilled. Due to the large amount of 
companies that the seventh AP-fund invests in, such guarantee would require unreasonable 
expenses according to the statement of the policy.195 
 
The following step in the due-diligence process asks business actors to integrate the findings 
in relevant functions and processes. This is important to ensure that the findings are properly 
understood and acted upon. The issue of integration is not very extensively discussed in the 
policy documents, but constituted one of the issues that the government particularly focused 
on in its latest report of the AP-funds to the parliament. In the report the government certify 
that integration is of importance to improve the work with ethical and environmental 
considerations and according to the assessment of the government the AP-funds have made 
significant progress on this area. The aim is to widen the group working with ethical and 
environmental considerations. Instead of limiting the responsibility to the specialists in these 
questions, the investment management of the Fund should be equally involved and implement 
these considerations directly. In a longer perspective, the idea is that ethical and 
                                                
194 Official homepage of the Ethical council – A systematic process – description of the work of the Ethical 
council: http://www.ap4.se/etikradet/Etikradet.aspx?id=598 
195 Ownership policy of AP-fund 7, p. 4f. 
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environmental considerations should constitute a natural part of the financial analysis 
conducted before an investment, the asset management and the corporate governance.196  
 
The integration process has not yet come that far within the AP-funds. Nevertheless, the AP 4 
is brought up as a good example, for its decision to place the responsibility of integrating 
these considerations directly on the different management divisions.197 Steps are taken, but 
there is more to be done before these considerations are fully integrated in the relevant 
functions and processes of the AP-funds. 
 
3.3.3.3 Taking appropriate action 
Next issue to analyse is whether the AP-funds take appropriate action to prevent and mitigate 
adverse human rights impacts. As previously stated, the Guiding Principles does not present a 
single definition of what appropriate action consists of and guidance has therefore been 
sought from the UNPRI. The AP-funds 1-4 have all chosen the direction recommended by the 
UNPRI and claim to be active owners in the companies they invest in. The principle for 
conducting an active ownership is that when companies that the Funds have invested in are 
alleged of causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts the Funds should act 
through its role as an owner to mitigate or make the infringements cease. The Funds should 
also promote the implementation of systems that might prevent such infringements in the 
future.198 
 
The Ethical council carries out the implementation of these principles. The most important 
method applied is to have an active dialogue with the company in question. The dialogues are 
carried out both preventively and in situations where the companies are alleged of 
contributing to breaches of international conventions.199  
Every allegation will not lead to a dialogue process, in fact only a very limited number of 
incidents are followed by such action. According to the Ethical council it takes the initiative 
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to start a direct dialogue with somewhere between 10-15 companies each year.200 This 
number must be considered small considering that around 4200 companies are monitored and 
100-200 out of these are thoroughly investigated because of allegations that the Ethical 
council deem as being serious. The reason for the limited number of dialogue initiatives is a 
lack of resources according to the Ethical council.201 Therefore the council selects a few 
companies where the problems are significant and well documented. The possibility for the 
Ethical council to make a difference is also of importance when choosing the companies.202  
 
The dialogue process can take several years and the Ethical council invests lots of resources 
in this work, both time and money. If the companies meet the objectives set by the council at 
the start of the dialogue they will be removed from the dialogue list, but will be subject for 
special monitoring for another five years. Since the inception of the Ethical council in 2007, 
eleven companies have met the requirements and been removed from the dialogue list.203  
 
As a last way out, if the dialogues do not give any result and the efforts to make a difference 
are deemed to be futile, the Funds are to exclude the company from their investments.204 
Exclusions are made on the recommendation of the Ethical council, and all of these 
recommendations have been followed by the Funds. So far eleven recommendations of 
exclusion have been made, ten of these regarding companies with a connection to 
manufacturing or selling of cluster munitions.205 What factors that would lead to exclusion in 
other cases is hard to tell since no guidance to when progress should be deemed as futile or 
when a process is considered to have taken to much time is provided in the Funds policies or 
in the reports of the Ethical council. 
 
                                                
200 Official homepage of the Ethical council – A systematic process – description of the work of the Ethical 
council: http://www.ap4.se/etikradet/Etikradet.aspx?id=598 
201 Swedwatch report # 42, p. 13. 
202 Official homepage of the Ethical council – A systematic process – description of the work of the Ethical 
council: http://www.ap4.se/etikradet/Etikradet.aspx?id=598 
203  Official homepage of the Ethical council – List of companies that have met the objectives: 
http://www.ap4.se/etikradet/Etikradet.aspx?id=694 
204 See for example Ownership policy of AP-fund 1 p. 9f and AP 3’s policy for ethical and environmental 
considerations, p.2. 
205 Annual report of the Ethical council (2011), p.25.  
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It should also be mentioned that the Ethical council takes a range of preventive measures, 
since appropriate actions to prevent adverse effects on human rights is equally important 
according to the Guiding Principles. Among other measures preventive dialogues are carried 
out with companies that run the risk of causing adverse human rights impacts. What 
companies that are subjects to these dialogues and the result are not accounted for, the Ethical 
council proclaims that discretion is a requirement for the dialogues to be successful.206 
Moreover the council collaborates with other investment actors in different preventive 
initiatives, which increases the leverage of the AP-funds in these areas.207 To increase 
leverage is yet another measure that is being recommended by the Guiding Principles.208 
 
The seventh AP-fund has chosen a different way to act in cases where the companies they 
invest in breach international conventions. The policy of AP 7 proclaims that no investments 
in companies that do not follow the international conventions ratified by Sweden are allowed. 
To establish that a company has failed to follow a convention a judgement from an 
international court or that the company admits to be responsible is required.209  The method, 
which is a sort of negative screening, is not very unusual or controversial, but not the one 
recommended in the UNPRI, which has been discussed above. It can also be questioned 
whether this method can be seen as an appropriate action to mitigate or prevent adverse 
human rights impacts. Since the AP 7 sells all holdings in companies that infringe human 
rights the leverage of AP 7 and their possibility to change the wrongful practices of those 
companies will be lost. The method forms a sharp contrast to the recommendations of the UN 
Guiding Principles that calls on business actors to exercise and increase their leverage, and to 
consider the ending of these business relationships as a last resort. 
 
3.3.3.4 Communication 
The last requirement of a due-diligence process is for the business actors to show that they 
respect human rights in practice and communicate this.210 All the AP-funds do communicate 
to some extent, how they work with ethical and environmental considerations. AP-funds 1-4 
                                                
206 ibid. p.14. 
207 ibid., p.7. 
208 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – Commentary to principle 19. 
209 Ownership policy of AP-fund 7, p.4f. 
210 Compare Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights  - Principle 19. 
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all mention their commitment to incorporate ethical and environmental considerations in their 
operations in the Annual reports, although these statements are described in very general 
terms with references to their ownership policies.211 Information regarding the practical 
measures taken during the year is instead found in the special corporate governance reports 
that each fund publishes. Furthermore the Ethical council presents its work in an annual 
report.212 The seventh AP-fund does also communicate how they address human rights 
impacts in their annual report, where the list of companies excluded (also known as the “black 
list”) is incorporated.213  
 
The basic requirements of principle 21 can be considered fulfilled. The Funds have a 
communication and the reports are easily accessible and recurring. However the content of the 
communication could be subject for discussion. According to principle 21 (b) in the UN 
Guiding Principle the provided information must be sufficient to evaluate the adequacy of the 
business actor’s response to the adverse human rights impacts it is involved in.214 The AP-
funds has been criticised for being vague in this sense, and the dialogues are surrounded by 
secretiveness. A statement saying that dialogues are on-going with a number of companies 
cannot be considered sufficient information to evaluate if the actions taken are adequate and 
appropriate.  
 
3.3.3.5 The measures taken in the cases of Marlin and Yanacocha 
This section will briefly describe the actions taken by the AP-funds on account of the human 
rights violations that have taken place in connection to the Marlin mine, the Yanacocha mine 
and the new Minas Conga project, as described under chapter 2.3. All funds except AP 6 
currently have holdings in both Newmont that runs the Yanacocha mine and Minas Conga, 
and Goldcorp that owns Marlin mine through a subsidiary.  
 
The description of the actions taken by the seventh AP-fund will be very brief, since the Fund 
has not taken any action. Neither Goldcorp nor Newmont are featured on the list of excluded 
                                                
211 See for example Annual report of AP-fund 4 (2011), p.21. 
212 Annual report of the Ethical council (2011). 
213 Annual report of the AP-fund 7 (2011) p. 10. 
214 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – Principle 21. 
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companies and no other information regarding these companies is provided in the annual 
reports of the Fund.215 
 
AP-funds 1-4, represented by the Ethical council, have had a different approach to these 
issues. The situation regarding the Marlin mine was brought to the council’s attention in 2008. 
In that year a representative visited the mine due to the troubles in the area. After the visit the 
Funds decided to submit a shareholder resolution together with a group of other investors, 
demanding that an independent HRIA should be conducted. The resolution never reached the 
Goldcorp’s year meeting, since the group of investors agreed to withdraw it in exchange for a 
promise from Goldcorp that a HRIA would be conducted.216 Goldcorp has also been one of 
the companies featured on the Ethical council’s dialogue list since 2008. The objectives set up 
by the Ethical council is that Goldcorp should develop policies and programmes to manage 
their human rights impacts and ensure that they respect the rights of the indigenous people in 
the area.217 The Ethical council states that the dialogue has been constructive and that the 
company has taken good measures and is working to solve the problems that were brought up 
in the HRIA. Still there are issues that must be attended to, and for that reason the dialogue is 
still on-going.218 
 
As described previously the Yanacocha mine has also been surrounded by problems since the 
start, many of them similar to the ones in the Marlin case. Even so, the reaction from the 
Ethical council has failed to appear in this case. Neither Newmont nor Buenaventura is or 
have been on the dialogue list and the Funds have not taken any other actions to prevent or 
mitigate the adverse human rights impacts connected to these companies and their operations 
in the Yanacocha area.  
 
 
 
                                                
215 See Annual report of AP-fund 7 (2011) p.10.  
216 Annual report of the Ethical council (2011) p. 16. 
217 Annual report of the Ethical council (2011) p. 22. 
218 ibid. p. 17. 
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3.3.5 Discussion and preliminary conclusions regarding Pillar II 
After conducting the analysis regarding the AP-funds and their compliance with the 
requirements in Pillar II in the UN Guiding Principles the general impression is that none of 
the Funds completely fail to meet any of the different sets of requirements. All Funds follow 
the provisions, at least on a fundamental level and there have been improvements in the way 
the Funds address adverse human rights impacts.  
 
The quality of the performances and the policies can be said to differ among the Funds. One 
example is the ways the Funds stipulate the human rights expectations they have on the 
companies in which they invest. It must be assumed that the Funds that specify their 
expectations more exhaustively and set up detailed requirements are more likely to achieve a 
good result. 
 
Every Fund takes measures to identify adverse human rights impacts and have also started the 
process to integrate these findings in their operations, even though further steps must be taken 
to meet this requirement. Next step in the due-diligence process requires the Funds to take 
appropriate action to prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts. It can be questioned 
whether the AP 7 meets this requirement. Unlike AP 1-4 that have all chosen the method 
recommended by UNPRI and take action by using their leverage to influence companies in 
which they invest, the AP 7 choses to sell their holdings if a company would adversely impact 
human rights.  
 
The method that AP 7 uses is often advocated by NGOs and may seem efficient and attractive. 
My opinion is however that the approach recommended by the UNPRI and the UN Guiding 
Principles that the investors take their responsibility and try to influence the companies in 
which they invest, will prove to be more efficient to ensure the enjoyment of human rights in 
the long run. To sell all holdings in companies that have been accused of violating human 
rights might be an efficient way of avoiding association, but is unlikely to lead to change as 
long as other investors are staying.  
 
I started out by stating that all Funds seem to follow the provisions, at least at a fundamental 
level. The question is however, whether a fundamental level is enough in this case. Since the 
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UN Guiding Principles focuses on the process rather than the outcome, this analysis is harder 
to conduct with the help of this instrument. It is however stated in one of the foundational 
principles that the means through which the business actor meets its responsibility to respect 
human rights should be proportional to among other factors its size and potential to impact 
human rights.219 
 
It is therefore legitimate to question the reasonableness of the fact that only 10-15 companies 
are being contacted for a dialogue process each year, when more than 4200 are being 
monitored. The number of dialogues being limited to 10-15 is a question of resources 
according to the Ethical council. Today the Funds only places a few thousandths of their 
administrative budget on their work with ethical and environmental considerations and the 
Funds are currently seeking to reduce administrative costs.220 This makes it unlikely that more 
resources will be allocated to the Ethical council, even though budget allocation to enable 
appropriate action to be taken is required according to Principle 19 in the UN Guiding 
Principles. I trace the fact that both the ambition and the budget is so low to the low ambition 
of the policy statement from the government, proclaiming that ethical considerations are to be 
subordinated to economical aspects. These priorities are also stated in the ownership policies 
of the Funds and the seventh AP- fund even reserves from fulfilling the parts of the policy 
concerning ethical considerations referring to a lack of resources. 
 
When looking at the actions taken by the AP-funds in the two examples that have been used 
as illustration, the result seems very arbitrary. When actions have been taken, as in the case of 
the Marlin mine it seems to have given result and mitigated the adverse human rights impacts, 
even though not all issues are solved. However, the situation in connection to the Yanacocha 
mine that is similar in many ways and have resulted in serious violations of the right to health, 
right to water and even the right to life, has not led to any measures being taken. This 
suggests that there are not enough resources to address all adverse human rights impacts that 
the Funds have been associated with. 
 
                                                
219 Compare Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – Commentary to principle 14. 
220 Swedwatch report #42, p. 54ff. 
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4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to further investigate the legal responsibilities for Sweden 
and the AP-funds with regard to the human rights infringements that the Funds have been 
associated with. The intention with conducting this investigation was to be able to determine 
if these actors could be criticised for not fulfilling international principles of business and 
human rights. 
 
The field of Business and human rights has been growing in importance during the latest 
decades along with the increasing influence of business actors. In 2011 the Human Rights 
Council unanimously endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
The instrument is the final result of John Ruggie’s mandate as a SRSG, during which he has 
clarified the standards of the state duty to protect and the corporate responsibility to respect 
human right and incorporated these standards in a coherent and operational instrument. These 
principles has served as the benchmark for the analysis carried out in this thesis and the 
research question to which an answer has been sought is whether Sweden and the AP-funds 
meet the requirements of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.  
 
After having carried out an evaluation and analysis of Sweden’s and the AP-funds’ 
compliance with the provisions of the UN Guiding Principles, both positive and negative 
aspects can be brought up for discussion. On the positive side is that the question of human 
rights and other ethical considerations has received a lot of attention both at the governmental 
level, but also at the level of the AP-funds. There have been governmental investigations with 
the mission of investigating these issues and the question is still on the agenda and being 
debated in the parliament. During the course of the recent years changes have been made that 
constitute an improvement for the fulfilment of the UN Guiding Principles, among these 
changes are the fact that the government has started to evaluate the ethical work of the Funds 
on an annual basis and that the government now demands that the AP-funds communicate 
how they address human rights impacts within their operations.  
 
The AP-funds have also made improvements lately, new ownership policies that more 
explicitly addresses ethical considerations have been adopted and the Funds have started the 
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process to integrate these considerations in their operations. Although there are much more to 
be done, these changes constitute steps in the right direction. As of today the Funds seem to 
have developed a set of tools and a system to address adverse human rights impacts that in 
many ways follow the requirements of the UN Guiding Principles.  
 
However, there are also reasons to criticise Sweden and the AP-funds, and on a number of 
matters the actors currently fail to meet the requirements set up in the UN Guiding Principles. 
Examples of such failures is the State’s decision to exclude the AP-funds from the 
applicability of Sweden’s Global Development Policy, which risks the fulfilment of the 
demand for policy coherence. Another example is the method AP 7 applies in situation where 
companies in which they have investments are being accused for violating human rights. To 
sell all holdings and cut the possibility to influence can hardly be said to correspond with 
using and increasing leverage and think of ending the relationship as the last solution, which 
is advocated in the UN Guiding Principles. 
 
My most severe critic is however not connected to a particular principle, but rather to the 
striking lack of ambition and dedication to these issues, most clearly illustrated by the 
statement in the proposition to the Public Pension Funds Act, where the Funds are demanded 
to take ethical considerations into account, but without deviating from the overall objective of 
a high rate of return. The statement gives the impression that ethical considerations will have 
a negative impact on the economical results, which cannot be accepted. This limits the scope 
for the AP-funds to what extent they are able to take these considerations into account, since 
many measures might impact the high rate of return at least in a short-term. 
 
When taking a closer look at the content of the ethical work of the Funds this lack of ambition 
is present also on this level. A system to address adverse human rights impacts has been 
constructed and set in place, but the level of ambition seems to be limited. The ownership 
policies where the values regarding human rights that should be taken into account are 
presented also contain reservations, stating that the overall objective of a high rate of return 
must be prioritized and that the policy might not be fulfilled due to a lack of resources. 
Furthermore the extent to which measures are being taken most also be considered as very 
limited, both in amount of resources spent and number of companies affected by these 
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measures, possibly too limited to be considered as appropriate action according to the UN 
Guiding Principles. 
 
I would therefore answer my research question with a yes and a no. On certain aspects the 
AP-funds and Sweden do meet the requirements of the UN Guiding Principles, but there are 
also parts where compliance can be questioned and the ways measures are taken must be 
discussed.  
 
What will be the consequences of the conclusion that the actors fail to meet some of the 
requirements presented in the UN Guiding Principles? From a legal perspective I would 
consider it very unlikely that it will bring any consequences at all. The UN Guiding Principles 
is not a legally binding instrument to which States or business actors have signed up, it should 
be seen as an instrument to guide actors and the principles are not enforceable.  
 
Instead I hope that the increased awareness of this issue in Sweden and the on-going debate in 
combination with the incorporation of these principles in other international instruments that 
affect Sweden, such as the OECD Guidelines and EU’s CSR-policy, will lead to a change of 
direction in these issues and a better compliance with the UN Guiding Principles in the future. 
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